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Abstract 
 
We introduce DOSE - Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation - and use it to 
estimate individual-level loss aversion in a representative sample of the U.S. population (N = 
2;000). DOSE elicitations are more accurate, more stable across time, and faster to administer 
than standard methods. We find that around 50% of the U.S. population is loss tolerant. This is 
counter to earlier findings, which mostly come from lab/student samples, that a strong majority 
of participants are loss averse. Loss attitudes are correlated with cognitive ability: loss aversion 
is more prevalent in people with high cognitive ability, and loss tolerance is more common in 
those with low cognitive ability. We also use DOSE to document facts about risk and time 
preferences, indicating a high potential for DOSE in future research. 
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1 Introduction
An important hypothesis in behavioral economics is that people treat losses and gains dif-
ferently, resulting in most being loss averse: even if they are risk neutral, they tend to shy
away from positive expected value gambles with negative payoffs (losses). Loss aversion is
used as an explanation for a number of important economic phenomena,1 and is an essen-
tial ingredient in theories of reference-dependent preferences (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979;
Ko˝szegi and Rabin, 2006; O’Donoghue and Sprenger, 2018).
Yet, most evidence of loss aversion comes from economics and psychology labs, usu-
ally with university student participants who may have different preferences (Snowberg
and Yariv, 2018; Walasek et al., in progress). The hypothesis of differential responses to
gains and losses would thus benefit from individual-level assessments in a representative
sample. However, as we detail below, current methodologies make such an assessment diffi-
cult. To overcome these difficulties, we introduce DOSE—Dynamically Optimized Sequential
Experimentation—which estimates preference parameters precisely and quickly by selecting
a personalized sequence of simple choices for each participant.
Using DOSE, we find that around 50% of people in the U.S. are loss tolerant: even if
they are risk neutral, they embrace gambles with negative expected values. Loss aversion
is more prevalent in people with high cognitive ability, and loss tolerance is more common
in those with low cognitive ability. Moreover, we find that risk aversion over gains and loss
attitudes are equally stable (and more stable than previously appreciated), suggesting that
both are equally important in understanding risk preferences.
It is important to emphasize that, although surprising, the prevalence of loss tolerance
is not evidence against the hypothesis of gain-loss differences. Rather, it is evidence of
substantial heterogeneity in the asymmetry, with potentially important consequences. In
1Examples include the equity premium puzzle (Mehra and Prescott, 1985; Benartzi and Thaler, 1995),
asymmetric consumer price elasticities (Hardie et al., 1993), downward sloping labor supply (Dunn, 1996;
Camerer et al., 1997; Goette et al., 2004), tax avoidance (Rees-Jones, 2017), opposition to free trade (Tovar,
2009), performance in athletic contests (Pope and Simonsohn, 2011; Allen et al., 2016), and more.
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particular, loss aversion can, in theory, reduce the propensity to use financial products that
exploit common characteristics like overoptimism and skew-love (Kahneman and Lovallo,
1993; A˚stebro et al., 2015). Loss tolerance, on the other hand, makes people more sus-
ceptible to exploitation of these characteristics. Moreover, our evidence suggests that loss
tolerance is particularly prevalent in precisely the people who might benefit from additional
reservations about problematic financial products: those with low income, education, and
cognitive ability, and the aged (Kornotis and Kumar, 2010; Chang, 2016).
A new technique is needed to measure loss aversion (and other preferences) in representa-
tive populations. In the three studies that elicit loss aversion in a representative population,
two lose more than 70% of participants due to non-response and inconsistent choice (Booij
and Van de Kuilen, 2009; Booij et al., 2010). A third only recovers population distributions
of loss aversion, and is very sensitive to estimation choices. Depending on those choices, it
produces population estimates that vary from a large majority being extremely loss averse, to
almost everyone being loss tolerant (appendix of von Gaudecker et al., 2011). Individual-level
estimates are necessary to study the correlates of heterogeneity of preferences (Harrison et
al., 2002), or to calibrate personalized contracts (Andreoni et al., 2016). Moreover, standard
techniques for measuring other economic preferences produce unstable estimates (Meier and
Sprenger, 2015), and may unintentionally introduce reference points (Sprenger, 2015). DOSE
produces accurate (Section 3.2), stable (Section 4.4), and fast (Section 5.2) individual-level
estimates of preference parameters that are robust to alternative specifications (Section 5.1).
Using DOSE to study risk and time preferences produces similar—often less noisy—results
to prior studies using standard elicitation techniques (Section 4.2 and Appendix B).
DOSE takes the challenges of eliciting loss aversion—the need for multiple choices, and
usually a parametric model—and designs around them.2 DOSE uses the parametric struc-
2Estimating an individual index of loss aversion without a parametric structure attributes all differences
in the curvature of utility functions over gains and over losses to loss aversion. In principle, a non-parametric
approach allows a classification of people into loss averse/neutral/tolerant, but in practice many cannot be
classified. For example, using a non-parametric method, Abdellaoui et al. (2007) find that between 29% and
88% of participants cannot be classified, depending on which definition of loss aversion is used.
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ture, and rapid computation of Bayesian updating, to dynamically select a personalized
sequence from a set of simple choices, as described in Section 2. That is, DOSE starts with
a prior over parameters and/or models and, based on that prior, selects a question that
will maximize information. DOSE then uses a participant’s choice to dynamically update
its priors about that participant, and selects the next question in the personalized sequence
based on the new distribution over parameters and/or models. The sequence continues this
way until either the participant has been asked pre-set number of questions, or the precision
of the estimates for that participant is greater than some pre-specified criterion.
We use DOSE to estimate loss aversion using an incentivized, representative survey of
the U.S. population (N = 2,000), also described in Section 2. This incentivized survey has
several useful features. It is comprehensive, using a wide range of elicitations to measure
different preferences. Moreover, it is repeated, meaning the same participants are asked the
same questions twice, six months apart. These features allow us to establish a number of
facts about loss aversion, as well as evaluate DOSE, in an important practical setting.
Before examining data from the incentivized survey, we first examine, in Section 3, sim-
ulations indicating that DOSE is more than twice as accurate as two standard methods for
eliciting loss and risk aversion: the multiple price list (MPL; see Andersen et al., 2006, for a
review), and the Lottery Menu (Eckel and Grossman, 2002). We show this in two sets of sim-
ulations. The first uses the choices from lab/student samples (N = 120; from Sokol-Hessner
et al. 2009 and Frydman et al. 2011) in 140 questions similar to those we use in DOSE. We
use DOSE to simulate question orderings for these participants, and show that with only 20
(personalized) questions, DOSE captures most of the information from all 140 choices. We
then use the distribution of parameters among the 120 laboratory participants to produce
10,000 simulated participants. By generating the choices of the simulated participants in
different types of elicitations, we show that DOSE produces estimates that are at least twice
as close to the true parameter values as these other methods.
There is a much higher level of loss tolerance in the U.S. population than indicated by
3
prior samples. The loss aversion parameter in Prospect Theory, λ, indicates loss aversion
when λ > 1, and loss tolerance when λ < 1. In Section 4 we find that 53% of the U.S.
population is loss tolerant. This is higher than 13–30% (weighted average 22%, N = 1,023)
in the eight studies we are aware of that investigate heterogeneity in loss aversion (all in lab
samples).3 Moreover, the median level of loss aversion in our study is 0.98, versus 1.5–2.5
in other samples. We show that this difference is not due to DOSE: among 439 lab/student
participants in prior studies using DOSE—drawing on the working paper version of this
manuscript (Wang et al., 2010)—10% are loss tolerant, with a median value of λ = 1.99.
Moreover, those with greater education and cognitive ability, and lower age, are more likely
to be loss averse in our representative sample.4 These attributes describe the student samples
usually used in studies of loss aversion. Indeed, in our data, 23% of those under 35 with a
college education (N = 101) were loss tolerant, with a median value of λ = 1.75. Altogether,
this suggests that the prevalence of findings of loss aversion, rather than loss tolerance, may
be the result of inadvertently selecting highly loss-averse samples.
An important feature of DOSE is that it dynamically estimates, and adjusts for, an in-
dividual’s level of choice consistency. This produces two more substantive results. First,
although we find a correlation between higher cognitive ability and less risk aversion using
DOSE, we do not find a statistically significant relationship with an MPL-based measure of
risk aversion. However, if we examine only those participants DOSE tells us make consistent
choices, we recover a similar relationship using the MPL measure, suggesting that choice
inconsistency and resultant measurement error may lead to the mixed results on the rela-
tionship between cognitive ability and risk aversion (Dohmen et al., 2018). Second, we show
that DOSE estimates of risk and time preferences are more stable across time than MPL-
3These studies are Schmidt and Traub (2002); Brooks and Zank (2005); Abdellaoui et al. (2007, 2008);
Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009); Abdellaoui et al. (2011); Sprenger (2015); Goette et al. (2018). The figure for
Sprenger (2015) is reported in Goette et al. (2018), Footnote 8.
4Most studies of the relationship between cognitive ability and risk preferences have focused on lotteries
over gains (see Andersson et al., 2016b, Table E1 for a summary). The few studies with questions involving
losses have found that lower cognitive ability is associated with fewer expected value maximizing choices
on those lotteries—consistent with our results—although differences in design and data reporting make it
difficult to ascertain the degree of agreement.
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based measures. DOSE estimates are equally stable regardless of choice consistency, while
MPL-based estimates are less stable for less consistent participants, suggesting measurement
error in current methodologies is responsible for low levels of estimated preference stability
(Gillen et al., Forthcoming). Additionally, loss aversion is nearly as stable as risk aversion,
indicating that both are similarly important in describing a participant’s risk preferences.
Our results from DOSE are robust to a number of factors, such as misspecification and
removing participants most likely to not be paying attention, as shown in Section 5. Allowing
for different specifications of the utility function still results in much lower estimates of loss
aversion, and much higher estimates of loss tolerance, than prior studies on student/lab
populations. Moreover, we show that DOSE is equally fast to complete for people of all
cognitive ability levels. In contrast, MPLs take longer for everyone, but especially for those
with lower cognitive abilities. Removing participants that may be “rushing through” DOSE,
or our entire study, has minimal effects on the distribution of DOSE-estimated parameters.
Additional robustness checks are conducted in Appendices D, E, F, and G.
The paper concludes with a discussion, in Section 6, of the potential for DOSE to be
used more widely, and of research settings in which the procedure is likely to be particularly
valuable. Of particular interest are further questions about loss aversion that were not
covered by our design. We finish with a description of how our results fit with the broader
work in psychology and neuroscience on the processes underlying the gain-loss hypothesis.
1.1 Related Literature
Our work is related to three broad literatures: optimal experimental design, measuring
economic preferences and their correlates in broad populations, and loss aversion. We review
these literatures here: relationships between specific factual findings in this paper and others
are included when we discuss those specific findings, and in Appendix B.
There is a large literature on optimal experimental design in computer science and statis-
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tics, but there is surprisingly little development of applications for economics.5 Those few
studies that exist focus on static, rather than dynamic, experiments (El-Gamal et al., 1993;
El-Gamal and Palfrey, 1996). DOSE extends these ideas by implementing a dynamic design,
in which questions are selected sequentially based on a participant’s answers. This allows
for the identification of models and parameters at the individual level, in contrast to prior
designs which could only discriminate between models, or measure the distribution param-
eters, at a population level. Taking advantage of recent advances in computing power, we
are also able to account for a much larger range of parameters in designing an experiment.
Two papers have examined dynamic experimental procedures, drawing on an earlier
working paper version of this manuscript (Wang et al., 2010). Toubia et al. (2013) use
a very similar method to study risk and time preferences. Imai and Camerer (2018) use
DOSE to evaluate time preferences, but focus on model selection.6 The latter paper uses a
different information criterion—EC2 rather than the Kullback-Leibler divergence we use—
and a different model of inconsistencies in decision-making. The Kullback-Leibler criterion
is particularly well suited to efficient parameter estimation (Ryan et al., 2016) but may not
be as efficient in model selection. Thus, the main contribution of that paper is to illustrate
how the novel criterion EC2 is used, and apply it to distinguish different models of time
preferences (in participants recruited from MTurk) more rapidly and precisely than earlier
research. In contrast, the primary contributions here are to establish general performance
characteristics of the DOSE method, compare them to extant methods, and document new
facts about loss aversion in a representative population.
5The idea of optimal experimental design appears to originate most clearly in Peirce (1879), who described
an “economic” theory of experimentation and applied it to the study of gravity. The idea of dynamic
designs begins with Wald (1950). Chaloner and Verdinelli (1995) provides a useful review of applications
in statistics. Although little used in economics, optimal designs have been used in many applied fields
including in neurophysiology (Lewi et al., 2009), psychophysics (Kujala and Lukka, 2006; Lesmes et al.,
2006), marketing (Toubia et al., 2004; Abernethy et al., 2008), and medicine (Mu¨ller et al., 2007). See also
Aigner (1979) for an early survey in economics, and Moffatt (2007) for a discussion of potential applications
of optimal design to parameter estimation, including the elicitation of risk preferences.
6 Cavagnaro et al. (2010, 2013a,b, 2016) independently develop an adaptive framework for model discrim-
ination. Their implementations use many more questions than DOSE—for example, 80 in Cavagnaro et al.
(2016), 101 in Cavagnaro et al. (2013a)—making it difficult to use with a representative sample.
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Our paper also contributes to the recent literature studying the correlates of economic
preferences in broad populations. Many of these studies focus on the role of cognitive ability
in economic preferences, generally concluding that higher cognitive ability is associated with
greater normative rationality (Frederick, 2005; Burks et al., 2009; Oechssler et al., 2009;
Dohmen et al., 2010; Benjamin et al., 2013). We add to this literature in two ways. First, we
examine the relationship between loss aversion and cognitive ability, and find that both low
and high cognitive ability people tend to depart from normative rationality, but in different
ways. Second, we show that the mixed results on the relationship between risk aversion and
cognitive ability (Dohmen et al., 2018) are likely due to measurement error and imprecision
in the elicitation techniques used in prior studies.
Finally, our paper relates to a larger literature interested in understanding loss aversion.
Most studies focus on lab/student populations.7 von Gaudecker et al. (2011) is the most
similar to our work. As noted above, they focus on population distributions, and their esti-
mates are sensitive to estimation choices. Depending on those choices, they report estimates
of the median λ ranging from 0.12 to 4.47 (in their appendix).8 As we show in Section 5.1
and Appendix F, our results are relatively stable with respect to different specifications. It
is worth noting, however, that their results are not inconsistent with ours: the shape of the
loss aversion distribution we find (in Figure 4) is very similar to theirs. Moreover, some of
their specifications produce results much closer to ours than the prior literature.
2 The DOSE Procedure
This section introduces the DOSE procedure and our incentivized survey. We start with an
abstract overview of DOSE, focusing on the choices experimenters can make to tune it to
7See Table 1 of Booij et al. (2010) and Table S4 of Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) for estimates from lab
studies. We are aware of four field studies that measure loss aversion in non-representative populations, but
only report first moments. These studies feature samples of customers at a car manufacturer (Ga¨chter et al.,
2007), Vietnamese villagers (Tanaka et al., 2010), Mechanical Turk workers (Toubia et al., 2013), and U.S.
mortgage holders (Atlas et al., 2017). Reported first moments of loss aversion are similar to lab studies.
8Their estimation strategy also does not allow them to use the S-shaped utility function suggested by
Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979).
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their application, before describing the specific design choices we made to estimate risk and
time preferences in a representative sample of the U.S. population.
2.1 DOSE in the Abstract
DOSE asks each participant a personalized set of questions. Questions are selected sequen-
tially, using a participant’s previous answers to identify the most informative question at that
point in time. When selecting each successive question, DOSE accounts for the possibility
that the participant may have made mistakes in his or her previous choices. Altogether this
leads to accurate parameter estimates after only a few questions.
The procedure starts with a prior over a set of parameter values, and then optimally
(according to some pre-defined criterion) selects questions to pinpoint a participant’s prefer-
ences. The experimenter can choose a different prior, based on observables, for each partici-
pant. DOSE selects the optimal question given the prior and the optimality criterion. After
a participant answers the first question, DOSE updates beliefs using Bayes’s law, optimally
selects the next question, and so on. The process continues for as many questions as the
experimenter wants, or until posterior beliefs are more precise than some pre-set criterion.
DOSE can elicit more accurate parameter estimates than other common dynamic exper-
imental designs because it allows for the possibility that participants make mistakes, as we
illustrate by comparing DOSE with a simple partitioning method, in Figure 1. Partitioning
techniques include the iterative MPL (see, for example, Andersen et al., 2006; von Gaudecker
et al., 2011) and the staircase method (Falk et al., 2018).9 In the example in Figure 1, both
methods start with a uniform prior and offer participants a binary choice. In the first round,
each participant faces the same question (Q1 or q1). Beliefs are then updated depending on
the answer they provide, and the next question is picked optimally given the new beliefs.
The key difference between the two procedures is that a partitioning method successively
9The iterative MPL presents participants with an initial MPL, and then offers them a refined set of options
in another MPL. For example, if the choice on the first MPL implied a participant’s certainty equivalent for
a lottery lay between $X and $Y, the next MPL would have options in [$X,$Y].
8
eliminates ranges of parameter values after each question. DOSE, in contrast, allows for the
possibility that any choice may have been a mistake, and hence places a positive probability
on all parameter values regardless of previous answers.
In a partitioning method, a single incorrect choice causes considerable inaccuracy. Con-
sider a participant with true parameter θ0, displayed in the bottom panel of Figure 1. This
participant should choose B in both questions of a partition method. If, however, he or
she incorrectly chooses A in the first question, his or her estimated parameter value is con-
strained to be less than the median value—regardless of the number of rounds of questions.
Errors early in the procedure thus lead to considerable measurement error. Any error makes
it particularly hard to identify parameter values at the extremes of the distribution.
DOSE, in contrast, can elicit accurate parameter values even after a participant makes a
mistake. Even after an initial incorrect choice of a, the posterior distribution places a positive
probability on the true parameter value θ0. As a result, with enough correct answers in future
rounds, an accurate parameter estimate will still be obtained. Further, the procedure keeps
track of the extent of inconsistent choice, which, as we demonstrate empirically in Section
4.3, provides a valuable measure of participant behavior.
The precise way in which DOSE selects questions, or accounts for possible mistakes,
can easily be adapted to meet the needs of a particular research question. Researchers can
modify the optimality criterion used to pick the personalized question sequence, and can
choose any parametric model to capture the way in which participants make mistakes. We
explain the design choices we use in this paper in the following subsection.
2.2 DOSE Procedure to Estimate Risk and Loss Aversion
DOSE can be customized for particular research questions. The main objects of choice for
a researcher are the parametric specification(s), the prior distribution over parameters or
models, the set of choices to present to participants, how parameters map to choices—that
is, the structure of possible mistakes—and the information criterion used to select the next
9
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question based on current beliefs. This subsection details the choices we made to elicit loss
aversion from a representative population.
2.2.1 Utility Function and Priors over Parameters
We elicit risk and loss aversion using a Prospect Theory utility function with power utility
(Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). This utility function assumes that participants value pay-
ments relative to a reference point, which we assume is zero. The standard S-shaped utility
function in Prospect Theory implies that, for common parameter values, participants are
risk averse over positive payments (gains), and risk loving over negative payments (losses).
A kink in the utility function at zero represents loss aversion. Formally:
v(x, ρi, λi) =

xρi for x ≥ 0
−λi(−x)ρi for x < 0,
(1)
in which λi parameterizes loss aversion, ρi parameterizes risk aversion, and x ∈ R is a mon-
etary outcome relative to the reference point. If λi > 1, then the participant is loss averse.
If λi < 1, then the participant is loss tolerant. An individual with ρi < 1 demonstrates risk
aversion over gains and risk love over losses. So that higher numbers indicate greater risk
aversion, we use the coefficient of relative risk aversion: 1− ρi, in tables and figures.
The specification in (1) focuses on accurately estimating loss aversion with as few ques-
tions as possible. It does not allow for other common features of Prospect Theory: probability
weighting or differential curvature of the utility function over losses and gains. The lotteries
in our questions are further designed to minimize probability distortions, as all have 50/50
probabilities of two outcomes. Moreover, as most studies have found limited difference in
curvature across the two domains (see Booij et al., 2010, Table 1), we impose the same
utility curvature for both gains and losses.10 This improves the accuracy of the estimates
10Assuming the same curvature across gains and losses also avoids an issue with power utility: different
curvatures mean that estimates of loss aversion depend on scaling (Ko¨bberling and Wakker, 2005). More-
over, there will always be an amount x s.t. U(x) > U(−x) (Wakker, 2010). Our results are similar using
11
of λi as questions are not selected to separately identify the curvature in the loss and gain
domain. However, it is quite simple to allow for different curvatures even after conducting
the experiment—in Section 5.1 we show our results are robust to estimating this alternative
specification, and that the assumption of equal curvature is supported by the data.
Time discounting is modeled with a standard monthly discount factor and the power util-
ity function in (1).11 Utility from the perspective of the survey date is given by u(xt, ρi, δi) =
δtix
ρi
t , where δi is a discount factor and ρi captures the curvature of the utility function from
(1), t is the time from the survey date in months, and xt is a payment at time t.
While researchers must choose a parametric specification and prior distribution for data
collection, an alternative prior or specification can be used to calculate parameter values ex
post. The experimenter’s initial choices are used only to generate the personalized question
sequence: once participant choices are recorded, any other prior distribution or parametric
specification can be used to derive new estimates from the data. We use a joint uniform prior
over preference parameters to both select questions and estimate parameters. The range of
the prior distribution is chosen to cover the individual estimates obtained in Section 3.1.12
As shown in Section 3.1 this results in near-optimal question selection.
Re-analyzing the choices obtained using questions selected by DOSE with a different prior
or parametric specification allows researchers to obtain accurate parameter estimates even
when the initial choices are misspecified, as shown in Sections 3.1 and 5.1. Despite initial
misspecification, the questions asked still home in on a participant’s preferences, even though
the question sequence is not optimal in the sense defined by the question selection criterion.
As a result, DOSE still provides a great deal of information about individual preferences,
and precise estimates can be recovered ex post even with some initial misspecification.
the exponential (CARA) utility function Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005) suggest to avoid these issues (see
Section 5.1).
11The specification used for question selection in the time preference module also allowed for present bias.
In practice, however, we found very little evidence of present bias either in the DOSE module or the time
MPLs—possibly due to the fact that payment was, in general, not instantly convertible into consumption.
As such, the specification used to obtain estimates did not include a present bias parameter.
12In particular, the prior ranges are λ ∈ [0, 4.6], ρ ∈ [0.2, 1.7], µ ∈ [0, 8], and δ ∈ [0.2, 1].
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2.2.2 Mistakes and Choice Consistency
As described above, an important advantage of DOSE is that, when selecting the personalized
sequence of questions, it takes into account the possibility that participants make mistakes.
The process by which mistakes are made must be parametrically modeled for DOSE to
account for it. We model the mapping between utility and choices using the logit function,
which has been widely used in both economics and psychophysics due to its connection with
the random utility model.13 For any choice between options o1 and o2 with V (o1) > V (o2):
Prob[o1] =
1
1 + e−µi(V (o1)−V (o2))
. (2)
The logit function depends both on the utility difference between options o1 and o2 and
the choice consistency parameter µi ∈ R+. The probability of making a mistake—that is,
not choosing the value-maxmizing option—is 1 − Prob[o1]. This is decreasing in the value
difference between o1 and o2. This decrease is more rapid when µi is larger, so higher values
of this parameter represent greater consistency in choices.
The set of questions can be designed to reduce the likelihood of mistakes. Our options
were constructed to make expected value comparisons as simple as possible. All of our
questions include only two options, with only one of these being a non-degenerate lottery.
Each lottery has only two possible prizes. One of three payoffs (the sure payoff, and the two
lottery payoffs) is always zero. Choices are thus between either a lottery with a zero payoff
and some gain, versus some (possibly negative) sure amount; or between a lottery with a
gain and loss, versus a sure amount of zero. In the former case, the expected value can be
found by dividing by two. In the latter, one can ascertain if the expected value of the lottery
is greater or less than zero by comparing the size of the positive and negative payoffs.
We believe these questions are also unlikely to produce inadvertent reference points, as
13Specifically, choice probabilities will be logit if the errors in the random utility model have an Extreme
Value Type I distribution. See McFadden (2001) for a broader discussion of the history of the logit specifi-
cation and its properties. DOSE can easily be implemented with multi-answer question using a multinomial
logit or alternative probabilistic choice function.
13
MPLs have been shown to do (Sprenger, 2015; Chapman et al., 2017). However, this is
also a testable prediction: we can try to fit specifications with alternative reference points,
such as incorporating the endowment of points given at the beginning of the DOSE module.
As shown in Appendix F.2, this model produces a much worse fit: it only predicts 48% of
choices correctly, whereas our main specification predicts 88% correctly.
2.2.3 Information Criterion
In our implementation, DOSE selects each question to maximize the expected Kullback-
Leibler (KL) divergence between the prior and possible posteriors associated with each an-
swer. That is, the question that is picked at each point is the one with the highest expected
information gain given the initial prior and previous answers. The KL criterion has been
used widely in the optimal design literature in statistics due to its conceptual simplicity
and grounding in information theory (see Ryan et al., 2016, for a discussion and examples).
Further, the information maximization approach leads to consistent and efficient parameter
estimates under weak modeling conditions (Paninski, 2005). However, DOSE is easily mod-
ified to incorporate alternative information criteria—for example, Imai and Camerer (2018)
use DOSE with the EC2 criterion to discriminate between models of time preferences.
Formally, consider a finite set of possible parameter vectors θk for k = 1, ..., K, where each
θk = (ρk, λk, δk, µk) is a combination of possible values of the parameters of interest.
14 Each
θk has an associated probability pk of being the correct parameters. In the first question,
these probabilities are the priors chosen by the experimenter; they are then updated in each
round according to the participant’s answers. The expected Kullback-Leibler divergence
between the prior and the posterior when asking question Qj is:
KL(Qj) =
∑
k≤K
∑
a∈A
log
(
lk(a;Qj)∑
j∈K pjlj(a;Qj)
)
pklk(a;Qj) (3)
14We assume a finite space of parameters for computational ease. The KL divergence here is slightly
different from that in El-Gamal and Palfrey (1996). Their variant maximizes the distance between posteriors
(information) obtained under different models, whereas ours maximizes the information about parameters.
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where a ∈ A are the possible answers to the question, and lk(a;Qj) is the likelihood of answer
a given θk—in our implementation this is determined by the logit funciton in (2). DOSE
selects the question that maximizes KL(Q), the participant answers it, model posteriors are
updated, the question Qj that now maximizes KL(Q) is selected, and so on.
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2.3 DOSE in a Representative Survey
We now turn to the practical details of implementing DOSE in two waves of a large, rep-
resentative, incentivized survey of the U.S. population. The survey includes two DOSE
modules—one relating to risk and one to time preferences—as well as other behavioral elic-
itations, and cognitive and sociodemographic questions.16
2.3.1 Survey Implementation
The two waves of the incentivized survey used the same questions and the same people, about
six months apart. The first wave of the survey collected responses from 2,000 U.S. adults
and was conducted online by YouGov between March 27 and April 3, 2015. A second wave
recontacted the same population and received 1,465 responses between September 21 and
November 23, 2015. We use data from the first wave for most analyses. Results are similar
when using the second wave data, as shown in Appendix D.3.
Participants in the survey were drawn from a panel of respondents maintained by YouGov.
YouGov continually recruits new people to the panel, especially from hard-to-reach and low-
socioeconomic-status groups. To generate a representative sample, it randomly draws people
from various Census Bureau products, and matches them on observables to members of
their panel. Differential response rates lead to the over- and under-representation of certain
populations and so YouGov provides sample weights to recover estimates that would be
15We restricted the procedure to only consider questions that had not yet been asked of that participant.
In order to improve the estimate of µ, the procedure would eventually ask the same question multiple times.
16For specific details of the implementation of these, and other, questions see Appendix C and Chapman
et al. (2017), or screenshots and design documents at hss.caltech.edu/∼snowberg/wep.html.
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obtained from a fully representative sample. We use these weights throughout the paper.17
The behavioral measures in this paper were all incentivized: at the end of the survey,
two survey modules were selected for payment at random.18 All outcomes were expressed
in YouGov points, an internal YouGov currency used to pay panel members, which can be
converted to U.S. dollars using the approximate rate of $0.001 per point.19 To enhance the
credibility of these incentives, we took advantage of YouGov’s relationship with its panel,
and restricted the sample to those who had already been paid (in cash or prizes) for their
participation in surveys. The average payment to respondents (including the show-up fee)
was $9 (9,000 points), which is approximately three times the average for YouGov surveys.
For comparability, we convert points to dollars, using the exchange rate, in our analyses.
2.3.2 DOSE Modules
All respondents were asked two, ten-question, DOSE modules.
Risk Preferences: The first DOSE module elicited risk and loss aversion. Participants
were given 10,000 points and offered a sequence of ten binary choices between a 50:50 lottery
and a sure amount. Two types of lottery were used. The first had a 50% chance of 0 points,
and a 50% chance of winning a (varying) positive amount of points (of up to 10,000). The
17The attrition rate of ≈25% is lower than most online surveys. This is due, in part, to YouGov’s panel
management, and in part to the large incentives we offered. According to Pew Research, YouGov’s sampling
and weighting procedure yields better representative samples than traditional probability sampling methods
with non-uniform response rates, including Pew’s own probability sample (Pew Research Center, 2016,
YouGov is Sample I).
18We chose to pay two randomly selected questions to increase the stakes while making fewer participants
upset about their payoffs. Paying for two questions instead of one may theoretically induce some wealth
effects, but these are known to be negligible, especially in an experiment such as ours (Charness et al., 2016).
Paying for randomly selected questions is incentive compatible under Expected Utility, but not necessarily
under more general risk preferences, where it is known that no such mechanism may exist (Karni and Safra,
1987; Azrieli et al., 2018). An old and still growing literature suggests this theoretical concern may not be
empirically important (Beattie and Loomes, 1997; Cubitt et al., 1998; Hey and Lee, 2005; Kurata et al.,
2009), but there are some exceptions (Freeman et al., 2015). Dynamic designs are generally not incentive
compatible, however in practice this is of little concern—see Appendix A.
19The conversion from points to awards can only be done at specific point values, which leads to a slightly
convex payoff schedule. This is of little concern here as these cash-out amounts are further apart than the
maximum payoff from the survey.
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second had a 50% chance of winning an amount up to 10,000 points, and a 50% chance of a
loss of up to 10,000 points. In the latter case, the sure amount was always 0 points.
Time Preferences: The second module elicited discount factors and refined estimates of
the curvature of the utility function. Participants were offered a sequence of ten binary
choices between a lower amount of points at an earlier date (either the day of the survey,
or in the future) or a higher amount at a later date (up to 90 days in the future). The
maximum payment in each question was 10,000 points.
2.3.3 Additional Measures
The survey also contained more standard ways of eliciting risk and time preferences. These
serve as a useful comparison for DOSE.
Risk Aversion MPLs: Two MPLs asked participants to choose between a fixed 50/50
lottery and a series of ascending sure amounts. The row in which the participant first chose
the sure amount identified a range of possible certainty equivalents for the lottery—we use
the midpoint of this range. There were two MPLs of this type: the first had a 50/50 lottery
over 0 and 10,000 points, the second, a 50/50 lottery over 2,000 and 8,000 points.20
Time Preference MPLs: In addition to the DOSE module, the survey included two
MPLs to elicit time preferences. The first time MPL elicited the amount of points that the
participant valued the same as 6,000 points 45 days later. The second MPL elicited the
amount of points in 45 days that the participant valued the same as 6,000 points in 90 days.
This measure is used primarily in Section 4.4.
20See Appendix D.1 for more details on these measures, and additional analyses using them.
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3 Performance of DOSE versus Current Methods
We first demonstrate that DOSE works in simulated environments, before turning to our
results on loss aversion in a representative sample in the next section. We do so in two ways.
First, we simulate DOSE question selection using the choices of participants in two laboratory
experiments that used questions similar to those in our DOSE implementation. We show
that a 20-question DOSE procedure obtains parameter estimates that are close to (within
15% of) parameter estimates after 140 questions. Second, we use simulated participants to
show that, in the presence of mistakes or inconsistency, DOSE recovers estimates that are
at least twice as accurate as standard elicitations used to measure risk and loss aversion.
3.1 Simulating DOSE with Laboratory Data
The first simulation exercise demonstrates the benefits of DOSE’s personalized question
sequence. We use data from 120 student participants in two prior laboratory experiments.21
In each experiment, participants were asked the same set of 140 binary choices from the same
two types of questions described in the prior section. The order of these questions in the
experiments was somewhat random. In our simulation, we optimally order these question
for each participant using DOSE. After DOSE selects a question, we provide it with the
answer the participant gave in the experiment. The procedure then updates the probability
distribution over parameters, selects the next question, and so on. This allows us to compare,
question by question, the inaccuracy—the absolute distance from the true parameter value
as a percentage of the true value—of DOSE’s estimates with those elicited by a random
question ordering. As we do not have access to true parameter values, we substitute the
values one would obtain using the choices in all 140 questions.
A 20-question DOSE sequence provides a similar amount of information as about 50
2190 participants come from Frydman et al. (2011) and 30 from Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009). We attempted
to compare the performance of DOSE using Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE), the method in Sokol-
Hessner et al. (2009) and Frydman et al. (2011). However, as reported in Appendix G, we were unable to
obtain MLE estimates for a large portion of the sample. The MLE estimates that were obtained were less
accurate—relative to the estimate after 140 questions—than those obtained from Bayesian estimation.
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Figure 2: Optimal question selection rapidly leads to accurate estimates.
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Notes: Based on data from Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) and Frydman et al. (2011). Each line shows the
inaccuracy of Bayesian estimates (with uniform initial prior) obtained after each question, starting at question
10, under different orders. “Optimal Prior” and “Uniform Prior” refer to DOSE question selection using
corresponding priors. “Random” orders questions randomly, averaging over 100 different random orderings.
randomly ordered questions, as shown in Figure 2.22 The DOSE estimates of both risk and
loss aversion are consistently closer to the final parameter estimate, indicating—under the
assumption that the final estimate closely approximates an individual’s true parameters—
that the procedure provides accurate estimates considerably faster than selecting questions
at random.23 After 20 questions, the DOSE estimates are almost twice as close to the final
estimate as those under a random question ordering (12% vs. 21–22%). The DOSE estimates
are also more highly correlated with the final estimates (shown in Appendix Figure G.1),
an important feature when seeking to identify correlations between preferences and other
population characteristics.24
22For loss aversion, 45 randomly-ordered questions are needed to be as close to the final estimate as 20
DOSE questions. For risk aversion, 55 questions are required.
23Supporting this assumption, the next subsection finds that DOSE achieves similar levels of accuracy in
a simulation where we know the true parameter values.
24Further, the average benefits we estimate are not limited to the particular distribution of preferences
we observe in the laboratory. As we show in Appendix G, the DOSE estimates converge rapidly to the final
estimate for the entire range of λ and ρ.
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These simulations also show that using the uniform prior is close to optimal for question
selection. To do so, we compare the performance of DOSE question selection using a uniform
prior to that using an optimal prior constructed from the distribution of the estimates after
140 questions. To focus on the question selection impacts of the prior, we estimate the
parameter values using a uniform prior in both cases. As shown in Figure 2, the accuracy is
similar whether using the optimal or uniform prior.
3.2 Parameter Recovery Study
When participants make mistakes DOSE produces estimates that are about twice as accurate
as traditional risk and loss aversion elicitation mechanisms. We demonstrate this with a
parameter recovery study (or Monte Carlo simulation). This is conducted with an entirely
simulated dataset that allows us to both know and control the true parameters governing
(simulated) participant behavior. Appendix E provides full details.
We evaluate the relative (in)accuracy of DOSE, and two other common risk elicitation
procedures, using 10,000 simulated participants with power utility given in (1), who make
binary choices probabilistically according to (2). For each of these participants, a set of
parameter values (ρi, λi, and µi) are drawn from the posterior distribution obtained from
the 120 laboratory participants in the previous subsection. We obtain DOSE estimates by
running 10- and 20-question DOSE procedures for each simulated participant, determining
the answer to each question according to her parameters.
As a benchmark for DOSE, we also allow our simulated participants to make choices
in two other common risk elicitation methods: the Lottery Menu (Eckel and Grossman,
2002), and a double MPL (Andersen et al., 2008a; Andreoni and Sprenger, 2012b). In the
Lottery Menu, participants choose from a list of six 50/50 lotteries over gains. In the double
MPL, participants complete two MPLs, each offering a choice between a fixed 50/50 lottery
and a series of ascending sure amounts. The first—which identifies risk aversion—offers a
lottery over gains ($0 and $10), while the second—identifying loss aversion—offers a lottery
20
Table 1: DOSE produces more accurate estimates.
Spearman Rank
Average Correlation with
Inaccuracy True Value
Loss Aversion
DOSE 10 question 21% 0.86
DOSE 20 question 15% 0.91
Multiple Price List 36% 0.65
Risk Aversion
DOSE 10 question 21% 0.66
DOSE 20 question 15% 0.79
Multiple Price List 37% 0.45
Lottery Menu 35% 0.28
Notes: Inaccuracy is the absolute distance from the true parameter value as a percentage
of the true value.
between a gain and a loss, both of $10. In both cases, we define a probability distribution
over the possible choices using sequential pairwise comparison of the options with the same
logit choice function in (2). This probability distribution is used to calculate the expected
inaccuracy of the parameter estimate for each simulated participant.
The estimates of risk and loss aversion from DOSE are approximately twice as accurate
as those from the other elicitation procedures, as shown in Table 1. After 20 questions,
DOSE obtains estimates of risk and loss aversion that are, on average, within 15% of the
true parameter value. The average inaccuracy of the MPL and Lottery Menu procedures, in
contrast, is at least 35%—much higher than even a 10-question DOSE procedure.25
DOSE produces more accurate estimates than both other procedures regardless of par-
ticipants’ level of choice consistency (µ), as shown in Figure 3. This figure repeats the
parameter recovery analysis above, but assigns all simulated participants the same level of
choice consistency, µ. We then vary µ across percentiles of the population distribution. The
20-question DOSE procedure always provides the most accurate estimates. Even the 10-
25The improvement in accuracy from DOSE is similar when the utility function used in the question
selection procedure is misspecified—see Section 5.1 and Appendix F.
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Figure 3: DOSE is more accurate than other methods at all levels of choice consistency.
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Notes: Estimates obtained using simulation procedure described in Appendix E, with all simulated partici-
pants at a point in the graph having the same value of µ.
question procedure performs better than either the MPL or Lottery Menu, except amongst
extremely inconsistent participants.26
The high accuracy of the DOSE estimates also leads to higher correlations with the true
parameter values than the other two procedures (column 2 of Table 1). Thus, DOSE is less
likely to miss associations between economic preferences and other characteristics through
attenuation bias. The correlation between the true risk aversion parameter and the DOSE
estimate is 0.79, compared to 0.45 with the MPL estimates and 0.28 for the Lottery Menu.
For loss aversion, the DOSE procedure produces correlations above 0.85 with the true values,
even after a 10-question procedure. This is reflected in our survey results, see Section 4.3.
Unlike the MPL, DOSE is able to elicit loss aversion estimates even when participants’
choices violate First Order Stochastic Dominance (FOSD), although this is not an important
factor in the simulation results of Table 1. Because DOSE accounts for the possibility that
26Although the Lottery Menu procedure appears to perform better than the MPL for inconsistent par-
ticipants, this advantage is not robust to alternative simulation assumptions, which can drive the average
inaccuracy for low consistency participants as high as 139%. See Appendix E.1 for further details.
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a participant’s choice is a mistake, the procedure can always recover parameter estimates.
In the double MPL, on the other hand, participants may erroneously make choices on the
second MPL (used to elicit loss aversion) that are First Order Stochastically Dominated given
their choices on the first MPL (used to elicit risk aversion). This prevents estimation of the
loss aversion parameter. In our simulation, the MPL could not recover estimates for 11% of
participants—increasing to more than 50% of participants with low choice consistency.
In practice, the double MPL procedure is unable to elicit loss aversion for a significant
proportion of the population, which may lead to biased conclusions about loss aversion. In
particular, the double MPL used by Chapman et al. (2018) is unable to recover estimates for
37% of their participants, as measurement error and other factors lead to these participants
appearing to make FOSD choices. The prevalence of these choice patterns was not random:
loss aversion could only be computed for 50% of participants in the bottom quartile of
cognitive ability, compared to 70% in the upper quartile. The results in this paper (see
Section 4.2) indicate that high cognitive ability is associated with more loss aversion. This
pattern of missing observations may thus lead to a biased over-estimate of loss aversion.27
In practice, choice data in the MPL is likely noisier than our simulations assume. To
estimate the relative amount of noise in the survey, we compare simulated and real responses
for three additional MPLs—the double MPL procedure (but with different payoffs), and a
second risk aversion MPL as implemented in Chapman et al. (2018).28 The proportion of
FOSD responses in the loss aversion MPL is much lower in this simulation than the real
data: 20% rather than 37%. Further, the correlation between the certainty equivalents in
the risk aversion MPLs—which is higher in the presence of less measurement error (Gillen
et al., Forthcoming)—is higher in the simulation: 0.73 vs. 0.69.29
27The survey in Chapman et al. (2018) is similar to the one in this paper, although it did not utilize DOSE.
Note this pattern of responses is consistent with results in the next section, as loss-tolerant individuals will
wish to make choices that are close to violating FOSD, and measurement error can push them over the
threshold. Low cognitive ability participants are more loss tolerant and make more FOSD choices.
28These MPLs have a different structure from those used in the results in Table 1 and Figure 3, but the
simulation methodology is the same. Full details of the simulations are reported in Appendix E.
29It appears that our simulations underestimate the measurement error in the survey MPLs because we
do not account for participants’ use of rules-of-thumb. Compared to our simulation, participants in the
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4 Economic Preferences in a Representative Sample
The U.S. population is more loss tolerant than those in lab-based samples. Consistent with
this finding, higher cognitive ability participants are more loss averse. This contrasts with the
prior literature that suggests that those with higher cognitive ability are more “rational,” or,
as it applies here, more likely to make expected value maximizing choices. DOSE estimates
of risk aversion, discounting, and choice consistency, are in-line with this perspective: higher
cognitive ability participants are less risk averse and more patient. The literature, however,
has found mixed results about the relationship between risk aversion and cognitive ability.
We use DOSE estimates of choice consistency (µ) to show that these results may be driven
by inconsistent choice. In particular, we show that if we examine those with above-median
choice consistency we recover a correlation between MPL-based measures of risk aversion
and cognitive ability that is obscured when examining all participants.
Further, prior estimates of the cross-time stability of economic preferences may be un-
derstated. Cross-time consistency of DOSE estimates of risk aversion and discounting are
higher than both MPLs and prior studies. The cross-time stability of loss aversion, which
has not been previously measured, is comparable to that of risk aversion and discounting,
suggesting that loss attitudes are at least as stable a descriptor of preferences as these other,
more common, measured preferences.
The results in this section are presented under the assumption, driven by the results in
Section 3, that DOSE is capturing useful information about economic preferences. Although
some of the analyses in this section provide further support for this assumption, we do not
examine it in detail until the next section. There, we show that our results are robust to ad-
justing for a number of possible issues that may be unique to DOSE, such as misspecification
of the utility function used to select questions and analyze the resulting choices.
survey were more likely to switch in rows of the MPL that are especially salient—such as the first or last
rows, or those referring to the midpoint of the lottery. These choices may be capturing framing effects or
heuristics in the face of the large amount of information in an MPL. DOSE avoids these issues by using
simple binary choices that are likely simpler to understand—a claim supported by evidence in Section 5.2.
Thus, our simulations may actually underestimate the relative advantages of DOSE.
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4.1 Loss Aversion in the U.S. Population
We find far more loss tolerant participants, and thus a lower average level of loss aversion,
in the general population than in lab-based samples that have used DOSE, as displayed
in Figure 4. While the distribution of parameter estimates from DOSE are largely the
same across both waves of our incentivized survey, those produced by lab-based samples are
markedly different. This is also true for risk aversion: lab-based populations are less risk
averse than the general population, in-line with prior research (see Snowberg and Yariv,
2018, and references therein).30 We compare estimates of risk aversion in this study and
prior studies when examining robustness in Appendix B.
The median estimate of the loss aversion parameter, λ = 0.98, in the U.S. population is
much lower than the “standard” estimate of 2 (Fehr-Duda and Epper, 2012). However, in-
line with prior studies, DOSE in the lab (N = 439) produces a median estimate of λ = 1.99.
Our lab results come from studies using DOSE in much the same way we do here, based on
our original working paper. For details on three of these studies, see Clay et al. (2017, in
progress) and Krajbich et al. (2017). The fourth study is unpublished, and ran the DOSE
procedure on 207 students at UCLA.31 We use the individual choices from these studies to
calculate parameter estimates as described in Section 2.
The proportion of loss-tolerant participants in the U.S. population—53%—is higher than
in the eight studies, referenced in the Introduction, that have investigated heterogeneity in
loss aversion (all in lab samples). In those experiments, between 13% and 30% (weighted av-
erage: 22%, N = 1,023) of participants in laboratory experiments are loss tolerant. However,
as noted above, the methodologies used in several of these studies make classifying many
participants impossible. Our representative sample also produces different results than other
30The median CRRA coefficient (1-ρ) in the general population is 0.31 vs. 0.05 in the student/lab sample.
We do not have DOSE estimates of the discount rate in the lab. However, the median monthly discount factor
here (0.90) is in the lowest quartile of the results of three recent laboratory studies using the Convex Time
Budget method of Andreoni and Sprenger, (2012a; see Appendix Table D1 in Imai and Camerer 2018). The
distribution of both the discounting and choice consistency measures are displayed in Appendix Figure D.1.
31The data was generously provided to us by Alec Smith.
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Figure 4: Distribution of Economic Preferences within the U.S. population
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Notes: The top panel displays the kernel density of each parameter, plotted using Epanechnikov kernel with
bandwidth chosen by rule-of-thumb estimator. The bottom panel displays the Nadaraya-Watson (local mean
smoothing) estimator (bandwidth 0.6) with Epanechnikov kernel and without sample weights.
field studies, discussed in the literature review. Two of those studies obtain estimates for less
than 30% of their participants (Booij and Van de Kuilen, 2009; Booij et al., 2010). A third
produces estimates of the median level of loss aversion between 0.12 and 4.47 depending on
the specification (von Gaudecker et al., 2011). As we show in Section 5.1 and Appendix F,
our results are much more stable under different estimation specifications.
Choice patterns clearly illustrate the source of DOSE estimates, as shown in the bottom
panel of Figure 4. The x-axis is the difference between the expected value of a lottery and
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the sure amount in a given choice. Loss-tolerant participants (λ < 1) are clearly more likely
to choose lotteries with losses than those who are loss averse (λ > 1), with loss-tolerant
participants choosing lotteries nearly 100% of the time when the expected difference is zero.
Note, however, that the flat parts of both lines in the left-hand side of the bottom-left panel
are due to the fact that DOSE only exposes those who have already revealed loss tolerance
through prior choices of lotteries with large negative expected values. Similar patterns exist
for those who are risk averse versus those who are risk loving: the latter are more likely
to choose gambles with gains at every expected value difference. For all four groups of
participants, the probability of choosing the lottery increases with the difference between
the expected value of the lottery and the sure amount.
4.2 Economic Preferences and Cognitive Ability
Our comprehensive survey allows us to document new facts about the correlates of loss
aversion and choice consistency in the U.S. population. An examination of the simple cor-
relations between economic preferences, socioeconomic characteristics, and cognitive ability
shows that cognitive ability is the most important correlate of loss aversion, and the other
three DOSE-estimated parameters. High cognitive ability participants are more loss averse,
while those of lower cognitive ability are more loss tolerant, on average. This correlation
reflects clear differences in the choices participants made during the survey: high cognitive
ability participants were consistently less likely to choose lotteries involving losses. Higher
cognitive ability participants are more patient (and consistent), in-line with previous studies.
Higher cognitive ability participants are also less risk averse. Examining this result in further
detail in the following subsection allows us to demonstrate that the mixed evidence on the
relationship between risk aversion and cognitive ability in previous studies may be explained
by inconsistent choice (Andersson et al., 2016b; Dohmen et al., 2018).
Cognitive ability was measured using a set of nine questions. Six questions were from
the International Cognitive Ability Resource (ICAR, Condon and Revelle, 2014): three were
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Table 2: DOSE preference parameters are correlated with individual characteristics.
Loss Risk
Patience
Choice
Aversion Aversion Consistency
(λ) (1− ρ) (δ) (µ)
Cognitive Ability 0.21∗∗∗ −0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(.030) (.028) (.029) (.026)
Income 0.15∗∗∗ −0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗
(.032) (.034) (.034) (.033)
Education 0.13∗∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(.032) (.033) (.037) (.032)
Male 0.08∗∗ −0.10∗∗∗ −0.02 0.01
(.033) (.032) (.035) (.033)
Age −0.10∗∗∗ 0.02 0.18∗∗∗ 0.05
(.033) (.032) (.036) (.036)
Stock Investor 0.06∗∗ −0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ -0.02
(.031) (.029) (.031) (.032)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors, in
parenthesis, come from a standardized regression. Each cell corresponds to a single regression.
similar to Raven’s Matrices, and the other three involved rotating a shape in space. We also
administered the Cognitive Reflection Test (CRT; Frederick, 2005): three arithmetically
straightforward questions with an instinctive, but incorrect, answer. Our cognitive ability
score was the sum of correct answers to these questions.
The relationships in Table 2 are consistent with the analyses in the prior subsection
showing that the general population is more risk averse and less loss averse than lab/student
populations. In particular, more educated, higher income, and more cognitively able indi-
viduals tend to be more loss averse and less risk averse; and lab populations have higher
cognitive ability than the general population (Snowberg and Yariv, 2018). Men and younger
people tend to be more loss averse, and those that own stock are less loss averse.32
The strong correlations between cognitive ability and economic preferences are robust
32Appendix Table D.2 presents additional correlations with Church Attendance, Ethnicity, and Home
Ownership, and shows that the correlations with the two components of cognitive ability (CRT and IQ) are
similar to the correlations in Table 2.
28
Figure 5: Low cognitive ability participants chose more lotteries with losses.
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Notes: Figure displays the Nadaraya-Watson (local mean smoothing) estimator (bandwidth 1) with Epanech-
nikov kernel. Grey dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals, constructed with 10,000 clustered boot-
strap replications. High and low cognitive ability refer to the top and bottom terciles, respectively.
to controlling for the other individual characteristics in Table 2—see Appendix Table D.3.
In fact, differences in cognitive ability appear to explain most of the relationship between
education and economic preferences.
The choices participants make differ by cognitive ability, as shown in Figure 5.33 Across
the range of expected value differences, high and low cognitive ability participants exhibit
different patterns of choice. In the first panel, which focuses only on lotteries with a loss,
low cognitive ability participants are significantly more likely to choose the lottery than high
cognitive ability participants. The u-shape of the curve for both ability terciles is driven by
the fact that DOSE only presents very negative expected value difference choices to those
who have already expressed significant loss tolerance. In contrast, in the second panel,
which focuses on lotteries that only contain a zero payoff and a gain, low cognitive ability
participants are significantly less likely to choose the lottery.
In summary, the patterns of correlation between cognitive ability and risk and loss aver-
33Appendix Figure D.1 presents the results in Figure 4 by cognitive ability tercile.
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sion in Table 2 are clearly driven by underlying choices. Low cognitive ability participants
are especially willing to accept lotteries with losses, even when those result in an expected
value loss. However, low cognitive ability participants are also less willing to choose a lottery
over gains, even when that results in an expected value gain.
Very few participants consistently make expected value maximizing choices, regardless of
cognitive ability. Fewer than 2% of participants made all EV-maximizing choices, and fewer
than 5% made more than 8 such choices (out of ten). Further, in contrast to some previous
studies (for example, Burks et al., 2009; Benjamin et al., 2013), we find the proportion
of choices that maximize expected value is only slightly higher for high cognitive ability
participants: those in the highest tercile of cognitive ability made 57% EV-maximizing
choices compared to 52% for participants in the lowest tercile.
4.3 Choice Consistency and Estimate Accuracy
Accounting for inconsistent choice can explain the mixed evidence about the relationship
between risk aversion and cognitive ability in previous studies (Dohmen et al., 2018). The
simulations in Section 3.2 show that, in the presence of inconsistent choice, MPLs measure
risk aversion with considerable error. It is well known that error will attenuate, and po-
tentially bias, any estimated relationship between these measures and other factors. In this
subsection, we show that inconsistent choice is related to attenuation bias in our survey. The
MPL measure of risk aversion on our incentivized survey is weakly associated with cognitive
ability, in contrast to the DOSE measure. However when we focus only on participants that
make (more) consistent choices, the MPL and DOSE measures exhibit similar correlations.
The MPL-based risk aversion measure is more weakly correlated with other characteristics
than the DOSE measure, as shown in the first panel of Figure 6. For example, the correlation
with cognitive ability is−0.04 (s.e. = .028), compared to−0.21 (.028) for DOSE. This pattern
is consistent with our simulation results, which showed more error in MPLs than DOSE.
Inconsistent choice is related to the attenuation of correlations. Once we use the DOSE
30
Figure 6: DOSE measure of risk aversion is more highly correlated with individual charac-
teristics before choice consistency is accounted for.
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Notes: Figure displays correlations between the DOSE and MPL measures of risk aversion and individual
characteristics. The left-hand panel includes all participants, the middle contains those with above median
choice consistency, and the right-hand panel contains those with below median choice consistency. The
survey contained two MPL measures of risk preference. Correlations are estimated by stacking the two and
clustering standard errors by participant.
consistency measure to exclude inconsistent participants, there is a strong negative relation-
ship between cognitive ability and the MPL risk aversion measure—see the middle panel
of Figure 6, which contains only those with above median choice consistency parameters
µ.34 The magnitude of the correlations is consistently higher for both risk aversion mea-
sures; however the contrast is particularly striking for the MPL measure, where a number
of relationships—including with cognitive ability—are now statistically significant. This is
despite the fact that standard errors are increased by only using half the sample. As shown
in the right-hand panel of the figure, DOSE estimates exhibit similar correlations even for
very inconsistent participants, while correlations with MPL estimates are almost zero. This
is also in-line with our simulation results.
The patterns in Figure 6 also demonstrate that the choice consistency parameter can
34As we discuss in Section 5.2, DOSE estimates may also contain less measurement error because the
binary choice questions are easier to understand than MPLs.
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identify individuals that make more mistakes even outside of the DOSE module, and thus
help researchers address survey noise. This information is difficult to obtain through other
easily available measures. For example, as we demonstrate in Appendix D.2, the correlations
in Figure 6 cannot be recovered by truncating the sample based on response time rather
than consistency. In fact, the consistency measure helps distinguish whether fast responses
reflect a lack of attention: restricting the sample to high-consistency participants recovers
correlations even among the subgroup of participants with particularly fast response times.
The value of the choice consistency measure is particularly striking when we consider that
our DOSE design did not focus primarily on eliciting this measure. Simple design tweaks—
such as allowing the procedure to ask questions multiple times—could allow the variable to
be measured more accurately, and hence provide even more information to researchers.
4.4 Within-person Stability of Loss Aversion
The within-person stability of the DOSE estimates of risk and time preference is higher than
other behavioral elicitations, both in our survey and in most previous studies. That is, they
are more highly correlated within-person across time, consistent with the fact that DOSE
reduces measurement error in parameter estimates. The correlation of DOSE estimates
across survey waves was 0.40 (s.e. = .04) for loss aversion (λ), 0.45 (.04) for risk aversion (ρ),
and 0.47 (.05) for discounting (δ). In comparison, the inter-temporal correlation between
choices in the two risk MPLs were 0.29 and 0.26 (.04 for both), and for choices in a risky
project measure (Gneezy and Potters, 1997) the correlation was 0.33 (.04). The stability
in the two time preference MPLs was 0.28 and 0.20 (.06 for both).35 These findings are
consistent with higher measurement error in the MPL measures, as suggested by both the
simulation results (Section 3.2) and the survey results discussed in the previous subsection.
Interestingly, there is no clear relationship between the stability of the DOSE estimates of
35The stability of the consistency parameter (µ) was 0.22 (S.E.=.05); lower than the other DOSE measures
but similar to the MPLs discussed above. Part of the explanation for this relatively low correlation is that
our DOSE implementation was designed to update more on other parameters: the relatively small number
of questions made it harder to identify inconsistent choices.
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preference parameters and choice consistency (µ), suggesting that by accounting for mistakes
DOSE blunts the impacts of them. For participants with above-median choice consistency
the over time correlations are 0.41 for loss aversion, 0.43 for risk aversion, and 0.47 for dis-
counting. For participants with below-median choice consistency correlations are 0.38, 0.47,
and 0.46, respectively. This is consistent with evidence in the prior subsection and section
that the accuracy of DOSE estimates is relatively constant across much of the observed range
of choice consistency—except for the most inconsistent.
The over-time correlations of DOSE estimates also compare favorably with methods in
prior studies. The only study we are aware of that measures stability of risk attitudes in the
loss domain is Levin et al. (2007), who report over-time correlations for 62 participants of
0.29 for a risk measure over gains, and 0.20 for a measure of differential risk-taking between
the gain and loss domain.36 Two further studies use incentivized methods to investigate
the stability of risk aversion (over gains) over lengthy periods, both finding lower over-time
correlations than the DOSE estimates. Gillen et al. (Forthcoming) find an inter-temporal
correlation of 0.32 for both of two risk MPLs and 0.36 and 0.47 for two risky project questions.
Lo¨nnqvist et al. (2015) report a within-subject correlation of 0.21 for an MPL measure across
a year.37 There is a similar pattern when comparing the stability of the DOSE-measured
time preferences to the prior literature, although differences in methodology and samples
make it harder to compare (see discussion in Appendix B). Thus, DOSE is an answer to
Meier and Sprenger’s (2015, p. 286) challenge to develop, “A more precise experimental
technique for eliciting time preferences...to make further study of stability.”
Notably, the DOSE estimates are more stable, despite these previous studies occurring
in the laboratory or with high-IQ college populations (or both)—suggesting that DOSE can
obtain levels of measurement error similar to a laboratory environment in an online survey.
Economists have often shied away from using incentivized measures in large samples because
36Levin et al. (2007) report correlations for 62 pairs of parents and children. The figures above are from
the adults, for comparability. For the children, over-time correlations are 0.38 and 0.30 respectively.
37Andersen et al. (2008b) elicit risk aversion over time, however, they do not report over-time correlations.
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of high measurement error and the prohibitive cost of implementing multiple elicitations
(Schildberg-Ho¨risch, 2018). DOSE overcomes this constraint and, as we show in Section 5.2,
the procedure is faster to complete than an MPL module.
5 Robustness
In this section we use our data to demonstrate the robustness of DOSE parameter estimates,
providing further evidence for our finding that a significant proportion of the U.S. population
is loss tolerant. DOSE obtains accurate parameter estimates even if the utility function used
in the question selection procedure is misspecified. Consequently, it is straightforward to test
robustness to different utility specifications: our survey conclusions are unchanged assuming
either exponential (CARA) utility or allowing curvature to vary across gains and losses.
Further tests suggest that our results are not driven by inattention or misunderstanding.
5.1 Robustness to Misspecification
DOSE is largely robust to misspecification of the parametric form used to select questions
because the choice data itself can be used to estimate the parameters of different functional
forms. This re-estimation can be done in response to new information, or simply as a
robustness check. In this subsection, we focus on the latter application, and assess the
robustness of our loss aversion results to different forms of the utility function over gains and
losses. Our estimates are largely robust. This should be unsurprising based on the patterns
of choice described in Sections 4.1 and 4.2.
Simulations indicate that using a misspecified utility function produces little change in our
results. In Appendix F.1, we run the DOSE question selection procedure with a exponential
(CARA) utility function for the simulated participants used in Section 3.2. As the simulated
participants make choices using a power (CRRA) utility function, this means that the utility
function used to select questions is misspecified. The Spearman rank correlation between the
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(misspecified) CARA risk aversion parameter estimates and the (true) CRRA parameters is
almost exactly the same as when using the correct utility function–0.75 (versus 0.79) for risk
aversion and 0.90 (versus 0.90) for loss aversion. Moreover, we are able to recover equally
accurate CRRA parameter estimates using the choice data. Even when misspecified in this
way, DOSE outperforms other measures by similar margins to those shown in Table 1.
Applying this procedure to our survey data, in Figure 7, shows that our conclusions
regarding loss aversion are similar using different utility functions. In addition to the CRRA
utility function used in (1), we add a CARA utility function, and a CRRA utility function
with different curvature parameters over losses and gains (Tversky and Kahneman, 1992).
The latter specification produces the biggest difference. However, the finding that a large
portion of the population are loss tolerant is unchanged: the proportion of participants
with estimated λ < 1 ranges from 46% to 53% across the three models. The variation in
the median value of the loss aversion parameter λ is very narrow across the three models,
ranging from 0.98 to 1.12.38 The second panel of Figure 7 breaks down both the one- and two-
parameter CRRA utility parameters by cognitive ability. Again, there is the same pattern
as in the prior section: those with higher cognitive ability are more loss averse, and those
with lower cognitive ability are more loss tolerant.
The CRRA model we used in prior sections fits the data best: it predicts 89% of choices
correctly, compared to less than 85% for the other two functions. Moreover, we estimate that
most (68%) participants are risk averse over gains and risk loving over losses, in-line with prior
experiments and Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979). The average difference
in the curvature between the domains is close to zero, offering support for specification (1),
although there is considerable individual heterogeneity—see Appendix F.
The individual choice data demonstrate widespread loss tolerance without making any
parametric assumptions. A loss-averse participant should never accept a lottery with neg-
38The correlation between the loss aversion parameters under different utility functions is greater than 0.8.
Risk aversion over gains is also highly correlated across the different specifications (Spearman correlations
of 0.98 or above).
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Figure 7: Results on loss aversion are robust to different parametric specifications.
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ative expected value in our implementation, as they could always choose a certain amount
of $0 instead. Yet, many participants do, as shown in Figure 4. Accepting a lottery with a
negative expected value implies that the magnitude of the negative value for a loss is less
than that for an equally-sized gain—implying loss tolerance. The fact that a large proportion
of the population is loss tolerant is thus apparent without any parametric assumptions.
The results in this subsection clearly demonstrate that the DOSE estimates reflect partic-
ipants’ choices. However, they cannot speak to the extent to which those choices accurately
reflect individual preferences or, specifically, whether participants comprehended or paid at-
tention during the DOSE module. Thus, in the next subsection, we address concerns that
our results are driven by a lack of understanding or care in completing the survey.
5.2 Response Times
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The questions we used in DOSE appear to be easy to understand. First, respondents across
the cognitive ability spectrum complete DOSE questions in similar amounts of time, as op-
posed to more complicated methods, which take lower cognitive ability participants longer.
Second, the speed of response is not evidence of participants “giving up,” or misunderstand-
ing the questions. Removing participants that complete DOSE more quickly has no effect
on estimates of the distributions of parameters.
Earlier results provide some evidence that participants did, in fact, find DOSE relatively
simple. The higher correlation of DOSE elicitations across time (compared to MPL elicita-
tions) suggests that it was easier to maintain similar response patterns even more than six
months later. Moreover, the fact that correlations between DOSE estimates of risk aversion,
discounting, and sociodemographic characteristics largely mirror the existing literature, and
are stronger than the correlations with MPL measures, also suggests that they more reliably
extract information on preferences. However, the fact that lab and general population results
differ could be interpreted as evidence of possible confusion in the representative sample.
As a reminder, we designed our questions in order to make expected value comparisons
as simple as possible, as discussed in Section 2.2.2. In particular, all questions contained
only one 50/50 lottery, and at least one of the three payoffs (the sure payoff, and the two
lottery payoffs) was zero. This implies that computing the expected value of a gain lottery
only required dividing the lottery by two. Comparing a gain/loss lottery to a sure payoff of
zero required only comparing the magnitude of the gain and the loss.
A way to assess the complexity of a question is the amount of time participants take to
answer: if participants struggle to understand a question they will usually take longer to
answer it (or much shorter if they give up). The DOSE module (including instructions),
was, however, fast to complete. The median time on the risk-loss DOSE module was 115
seconds, and on the time-discounting module was 107 seconds. In comparison, the median
time taken to complete the MPL instructions and first elicitation was 259 seconds.39
39The first MPL measured time preferences. The DOSE modules always appeared prior to this MPL.
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Figure 8: Low cognitive ability participants take longer on MPL questions, but not on DOSE.
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Notes: DOSE module includes 20 questions addressing both risk and time preferences. MPL module includes
two MPLs assessing time preferences, which was the first MPL module on the survey. Respondents with
response times greater than 15 minutes for either module are excluded. Both panels include time taken for
questions and explanatory text.
Additional evidence that DOSE was simple to understand is that low cognitive ability
participants took the same amount of time as high cognitive ability participants to complete
the DOSE module, in contrast to the MPL—see Figure 8. Participants in the top cognitive
ability quartile took, on average, 34 seconds less in the MPL module than those in the bottom
quartile. For DOSE, in contrast, high cognitive ability participants took 3 seconds longer on
average (p-value=0.68). Moreover, the variance of time taken was relatively constant across
quartiles, as indicated by the confidence intervals in the figure. Together, these facts suggests
that DOSE was equally easy for participants all along the cognitive ability spectrum.
However, just because participants, in general, seem to have found DOSE easier to un-
derstand than the MPL doesn’t mean there were no participants confused by DOSE, or that
all were paying attention. We examine this possibility next by re-analyzing our data while
leaving out those who were most likely to have given up and rushed through the survey.
The same results hold, implying that neither confusion nor inattentiveness, nor giving up, is
likely to explain many of the choices we see.
Our results are largely unchanged when removing the fastest responses. As shown in
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Figure 9: Distributions are similar when removing participants with short response times.
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Figure 9, the distribution of economic preferences is similar when restricting the sample by
removing participants according to the quintile of response time. That is, we first look at
the slowest 80% of respondents, then the slowest 60%, and so on. The distributions overlap
almost entirely—and the median loss aversion parameter consistently remains very similar
in the whole sample (1.02 or below): fast response or inattention cannot be said to be the
explanation for loss tolerance. Moreover, correlations with other characteristics are also
similar when removing the fastest respondents—see Appendix Table D.9.
A final manifestation of inattention might be choosing the same option in each question:
either the lottery (always listed first), or the sure amount (always listed second). However,
there is little evidence of this pattern of inattention in our results: fewer than 6% participants
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chose the same option in all ten question rounds. While we cannot rule out that some
participants rapidly clicked through the DOSE module, such behavior does not appear to
affect our results.
6 Discussion
In this paper, we introduce DOSE—Dynamically Optimized Sequential Experimentation—
and use it to study loss aversion and other economic preferences in a representative sample of
the U.S. population. Our results are summarized in Table 3. A few are worth highlighting.
First, we find that around 50% of the U.S. population is loss tolerant over small stakes,
differing from prior studies that have found a strong majority of loss averse participants,
usually in lab/student samples. Second, those with greater cognitive ability, education, and
income are more likely to be loss averse, and those with lower cognitive ability are more likely
to be loss tolerant. This, along with the fact that DOSE in lab/student samples produces
similar results to prior studies, suggests that differences in samples are likely the source of
the difference between our results and prior studies. Third, using DOSE’s choice consistency
parameter we show that those with high consistency exhibit a correlation on MPL-based
measures between higher cognitive ability and less risk aversion. This suggests that the
mixed results about this relationship in the literature (Dohmen et al., 2018) may be due
to measurement error (Gillen et al., Forthcoming). Fourth, across a range of evaluations,
DOSE produces better measures: more accurate, more stable, faster, and so on.
Our findings about loss aversion diverge significantly from conventional wisdom, raising
the possibility that the literature may have been influenced by factors beyond the inad-
vertent sample selection mentioned above. Hints can be found in Fehr-Duda and Epper
(2012, p. 576), who observe, “Since the publication of Tversky and Kahneman (1992), any
estimates of loss aversion that deviate significantly from the value of two have been eyed
with great suspicion, notwithstanding the fact that the original estimate was based on 25
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Table 3: Comparison of DOSE with Other Elicitation Methods
DOSE MPL
Risky
Project /
Lottery
Menu (†)
S
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ve

Loss Attitudes
Percent Loss Tolerant 53% n.a. n.a.
Median Loss Aversion Parameter 0.98 n.a. n.a.
Correlations w/Cognitive Ability
Risk Aversion -0.21 ≈ 0 -0.07
Loss Aversion 0.40 n.a. n.a.
Patience 0.18 0.17 n.a.
Correlations w/ Demographics
Risk Aversion X ≈ 0 X
Loss Aversion X n.a. n.a.
Patience X X n.a.
M
et
h
o
d
ol
og
ic
al

Representative Survey
Speed 115 secs 259 secs 33 secs
Stability: Risk Aversion 0.45 0.28 0.33
Stability: Loss Aversion 0.40 n.a. n.a.
Stability: Patience 0.47 0.24 n.a.
Parameter Recovery Analysis
Inaccuracy: Risk Aversion 15% 37% 35%†
Inaccuracy: Loss Aversion 15% 36% n.a.†
Correlation: Risk Aversion 0.79 0.45 0.28†
Correlation: Loss Aversion 0.91 0.65 n.a.†
Notes: “Inaccuracy” is the average absolute percentage difference between the estimated and true pa-
rameter values. “Correlation” is the correlation between the estimated and true parameter values.
“Stability” is the correlation across survey waves. X indicates that a pattern of statistically significant
correlations were identified. Observations denoted with a † are from the Lottery Menu elicitation—which
was included in our simulations, but not our survey—rather than the Risky Project—which was included
in our survey, but not our simulations.
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subjects, hypothetical decisions over relatively large stakes, and that no standard errors were
reported.” Relatedly, the one study that examines loss aversion in a representative sample,
von Gaudecker et al. (2011), report a median estimate of λ = 2.38, although specifications
in the appendix have medians ranging from 0.12 to 4.47. More directly, Walasek et al. (in
progress) analyze 19 studies of loss aversion in lab/student populations, and find evidence
of publication bias, and Yechiam (2018, p. 1) notes in a review of the loss aversion literature
that, “[T]he findings of some of these studies have been systematically misrepresented to
reflect loss aversion, though they did not find it.”
Our DOSE implementation provides estimates of risk aversion and time preferences that
also appear to dominate MPL-based elicitations. DOSE risk aversion measures show stronger
correlations with cognitive ability and other characteristics than MPL-based measures, as
shown in Table 3. Further, DOSE-based measures of risk and time preferences show greater
stability than MPL-based measures. These facts indicate, in-line with our simulations, that
DOSE produces estimates with lower measurement error in these domains as well.
A common concern about DOSE is that, like most dynamic methods, they are not incen-
tive compatible. For example, participants could misleadingly say they prefer a lottery to a
sure amount in the first question in order to increase the magnitude of the sure amounts of-
fered in the future. However, this is possible with any sequence of questions that participants
believe are dynamic—and few experiments explicitly rule out this possibility (our survey did
not explicitly mention the dynamic nature of our 20 questions). However, in practice this
is of little concern: Ray et al. (2012) find minimal possible benefits of manipulation, and
little evidence that even very sophisticated participants engage in this behavior even when
explicitly informing participants that the question sequence is manipulable. For more on
this concern, see Appendix A.
The accuracy, speed, and simplicity of DOSE potentially expands the range of research
settings in which incentivized preference elicitation is viable. The procedure may be partic-
ularly valuable in field experiments, where it is difficult to provide participants with detailed
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instructions. Similarly, it may also be easier to implement than more complex or time
consuming designs when conducting experiments with low literacy participants, children,
patients with medical disorders, or even animals. DOSE performs better with low cognitive
ability, low-education, and low-income participants, suggesting that it could be particu-
larly useful in development environments, where current elicitation methods can be plagued
by inconsistent choice (Jacobson and Petrie, 2009; Charness and Viceisza, 2012) and new
techniques are particularly needed (Berry et al., 2015). DOSE can also be used to discrimi-
nate between models on an individual level in real time—an application developed for time
preferences in Imai and Camerer (2018), based on an earlier working paper version of this
manuscript (Wang et al., 2010).
There is more to be learned about loss aversion with DOSE simply by broadening the
types of questions participants are asked. Offering participants lotteries with prizes only in
the loss domain would allow better identification of differences in the curvature of the utility
function in the gain and loss domain. Further, the degree of loss aversion may be affected
by stake size and “zero avoidance” (Ert and Erev, 2013). The questions used in this paper
involved only small stakes and always contained a prize of zero payoff—the sure amount
in questions involving a lottery with a loss, and one of the lottery prizes in the questions
only involving gains. These design choices could straightforwardly be varied to obtain a
richer view of the factors affecting loss aversion, and something like “zero aversion” could be
modeled directly and relevant parameters estimated.
Even with these questions outstanding, our findings relate to current psychological and
neuroscientific work on gain-loss differences. The fact that loss aversion depends on cogni-
tive skill suggests it may have some basis in effortful cognitive processes. Recent evidence
indicates aversion or tolerance to loss is associated with mental information accumulation
(Clay et al., 2017) and attention paid to losses and gains (Bhatia and Golman, 2015; Yechiam
and Hochman, 2013). The clearest evidence for the role of attention is that visual attention
to losses correlates modestly (0.31) with the loss aversion parameter inferred from choices
43
(Pachur et al., 2018). In addition, exogenously manipulating attention by visually present-
ing it for an extra 0.6 seconds increased estimated loss-aversion by about 10%. It would be
useful to know whether people with lower cognitive ability pay less attention to losses.
A small amount of neuroscientific evidence indicates stronger encoding in the amygdala
in response to loss (Yacubian et al. 2006; De Martino et al. (2010); though not in Tom
et al. 2007). The anti-anxiety drug Propranalol lowers loss aversion by about 15% (in
low-BMI subjects; Sokol-Hessner et al., 2015). Given the role of the amygdala in rapid
“vigilance” threat processing, these results suggest lower cognitive ability participants may
simply feel less fear or anxiety about losses. Experiments have shown that differences in
the distributions that are faced can influence choices—losses are more tolerated when many
choices include possible losses, due to a general cognitive process called “adaptive coding”
(Walasek and Stewart, 2015). Thus, it is possible that people with lower cognitive ability
are more routinely exposed to everyday gain and loss distributions, which create a tolerance
for loss.
Obviously, our incentivized survey data cannot test any of these mechanistic hypotheses.
Given the striking behavioral association between loss tolerance and cognitive skill, how-
ever, it would be useful to further explore the roles of attention, anxiety, and distributional
experience with low and high cognitive ability groups.
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Online Appendix—Not Intended for Publication
A Potential for Manipulation
In practice, the theoretical possibility that DOSE could be strategically manipulated—like
most dynamic designs—is unlikely to be an important concern. The adaptive nature of
the DOSE question selection procedure means that individuals could have an incentive to
misrepresent their true preferences in early questions to obtain more generous offers in future
questions. For example, participants could misleadingly say they prefer a lottery to a sure
amount in the first question in order to increase the magnitude of the sure amounts offered in
the future. However, such behavior is unlikely as the incentives for manipulation are small,
and it requires that participants understand both the adaptive nature of the procedure, which
is not explained to them, and how to manipulate the question sequence. The short question
sequence and general population sample in our survey means that neither of these conditions
are likely to be met. Further, DOSE could easily be adapted to combat manipulation in other
settings where there is greater likelihood of strategic behavior.
The incentive for participants to game adaptive procedures is small, and there is little
evidence of such behavior in practice. Ray et al. (2012) find that with a 10 question adaptive
sequence the excess earnings of a risk neutral clairvoyant agent are only 8% higher than a
myopic one who maximizes earnings in each choice. Further, they report that informing
participants in a laboratory experiment that the question sequence is manipulable did not
increase average earnings, and most participants stated that they did not try and manipulate
the system. There is also little evidence of manipulation—identified by behavior changing
significantly between early and later question rounds—in their data.
Strategic behavior is particularly unlikely in our survey, given that we ask only a short
question sequence and participants are unlikely to have previous experience of economic
experiments. The short question sequence means that there is little opportunity for learning
Online Appendix–1
about the adaptive nature of the question selection criteria, particularly as the type of choices.
In addition, we draw from a general population sample who—unlike the subject pools used
in laboratory experiments—are unlikely to have received formal training in economics or to
have participated in previous incentivized studies. There is no reason, therefore, to believe
that they would recognize the opportunity to manipulate the question selection procedure.
DOSE can easily be adapted to address concerns about manipulation in settings where
“gaming” is seen as particularly likely—for example, in the presence of large stakes. We
suggest two possible remedies, but others are possible.1 First, the actual question chosen for
payment can be randomly selected from all possible questions after the personalized question
sequence is completed. If that question has already been answered, the answer determines the
payment. If not, the participant answers it, and this answer determines payoff. In the second
remedy, the answers the participant provides to the DOSE questions determine parameter
estimates, which are used to construct the choice to one of the unanswered questions, which
is used for payment. Both designs mean that truthful response is incentive compatible—if
the model of preferences used is correct. The latter, in the presence of risk aversion, should
even increase incentives for consistent choices. However, both may reduce the strength of
participant incentives as each question has a lower probability of influencing the final payoff.
An final approach would involve using DOSE to assess the extent of strategic manipu-
lation among respondents. In particular, the possibility of manipulation could be built into
DOSE as a separate theory of behavior with associated prior beliefs. The DOSE questions
would then be selected in order to identify whether there is strategizing or not (as well as
the other parameters of interest).
B Risk and Time Preferences and the Literature
Our findings regarding risk aversion and discounting are broadly similar to those of pre-
vious studies in representative populations; the few differences appear to be explained by
1The first remedy was suggested by Kate Johnson, and the second by Ian Krajbich.
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our elicitation method. Risk aversion and discounting are widespread amongst our sur-
vey participants, but the median level of risk aversion is lower than found in the previous
literature—a difference explained by our use of binary choice questions rather than MPLs.
As discussed in Section 4.3, our elicitation method also explains the one major difference
with previous studies of the correlates of these two preferences: by accounting for variation
in choice consistency, we identify a strong negative relationship between risk aversion and
cognitive ability.
Differences in elicitation method appear to explain the lower level of risk aversion esti-
mated by DOSE than found in previous studies of representative samples. The mean and
median Coefficient of Relative Risk Aversion (1-ρ) are 0.25 and 0.31 respectively, compared
to previous findings ranging from approximately 0.4 (Dohmen et al., 2010) to 0.7 (Harrison
et al., 2007; Andersen et al., 2008a). This pattern is consistent with laboratory studies find-
ing lower levels of risk aversion using binary choice questions: the average coefficient using
DOSE is 0.05 in the lab, which is similar to the value of 0.12 found by Sokol-Hessner et al.
(2009) using binary questions, but much lower than the range of 0.3–0.5 found by Holt and
Laury (2002). Moreover, the median coefficient on the MPLs on our survey (0.4 and 2.1)
are more in line with previous studies.
The patterns of correlation between risk aversion and discounting and sociodemographic
characteristics we find (see Table 2), largely match the literature. The relationship between
cognitive ability and patience, unlike risk aversion, is well-established in both economics and
psychology (for example, Shamosh and Gray, 2008; Burks et al., 2009; Dohmen et al., 2010;
Benjamin et al., 2013). Patient individuals have also been found to have higher income,
greater savings, and more education (see DellaVigna and Paserman, 2005; Falk et al., 2018;
Urminsky and Zauberman, 2016). In the laboratory most studies have documented that
women are more risk averse than men (Eckel and Grossman, 2008), as have Falk et al. (2018)
in a representative sample. There is also some evidence of a negative relationship between
risk aversion and income, although results have been mixed (see, for instance Dohmen et
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al., 2010; Barsky et al., 1997). The most important difference from the literature is the
relationship between risk aversion and cognitive ability, where we find a strong negative
correlation, whereas results in the previous literature are mixed between somewhat smaller
negative correlations, no correlations and, occasionally positive correlations (for a summary
see Andersson et al., 2016b, Figure 1). As discussed in Section 4.3, it appears this difference
is explained by the fact DOSE accounts for inconsistent choice.
Measurement error may also explain the lack of consistent patterns emerging from the few
other studies that have examined the correlates of loss aversion in representative samples.2
Only one of those studies examined the association with cognitive ability, finding no evidence
of a relationship (Andersson et al., 2016a). The findings for both education and income have
been very mixed, with correlations sometimes negative, sometimes zero and—for income—
sometimes positive. The most consistent pattern emerging from other studies, but not
reflected in our results, is that women have been found to be more loss averse—whereas we
find no relationship with sex after controlling for other sociodemographic variables.
As noted in Section 4.4, the over-time correlation of the DOSE time preference measure
is larger than estimates in most previous studies, but direct comparisons are complicated
by differences in the sample used. In the most comparable study, Meier and Sprenger
(2015) report correlations of 0.36 for present bias and 0.25 for discounting parameters among
250 low- to middle-income Americans. In another field study, Kirby et al. (2002) reports
correlations of 0.09–0.23 over a six month period among Bolivian Amerindians. The only
study (Kirby, 2009) that finds a higher correlation than DOSE (between 0.63 and 0.71)
took place in a more controlled (laboratory) environment than our survey. The variety of
the samples makes comparisons difficult—it is not clear, for instance, how to compare our
representative online survey to the in-person, low-income sample in Meier and Sprenger
(2015). However, the results are, at least, consistent with the DOSE estimates being more
2As discussed in Section 1, those studies include Booij and Van de Kuilen (2009); Booij et al. (2010); von
Gaudecker et al. (2011) and Andersson et al. (2016a)
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stable over time due to reduced measurement error.3
C Additional Details of Survey Implementation
This subsection presents further details of the implementation of DOSE in the online survey,
including both the question selection procedure and the estimation of the DOSE parameters
presented in the main text. As discussed in Section 2.3, the survey included two DOSE survey
modules. The first module focused on risk preferences, and consisted of 10 binary choices
between a sure amount and a lottery.4 The second module focused on time preferences and
consisted of a further 10 binary choices between differing amounts at two different dates.5
Conceptually, the question selection differed from the outline presented in Section 2.3 in
two ways. First, after each question round the joint posterior was used to construct marginal
distributions for each of the parameters. These updated marginal distributions were then
used to construct the new probability distribution used for question selection in the following
question round under the assumption that the distributions were independent. Second, the
survey questions were selected using the Kullback-Leibler information criterion suggested by
El-Gamal and Palfrey (1996). The KL criterion they suggest captures the distance between
the parameter vector k and all other vectors if k is the correct parameter vector. That is, it
is:
KL(Qi) =
∑
k∈K
∑
a∈A
log
(
(1− pk)lk(a;Qi)∑K
j 6=kpjlj(a;Qi)
)
pklk(a;Qi) (4)
This formula is very similar to (3). The main difference is that the likelihood of model k is
3Chuang and Schechter (2015) provide a detailed review of previous studies of stability of risk or time
preferences. They document two additional studies that reported correlations from incentivized measures
over short periods of time. Dean and Sautmann (2014) find correlations of up to 0.67 over a one week
period in Mali. Wo¨lbert and Riedl (2013) report correlations of between 0.36 and 0.68 for 20 risk MPLs,
and between 0.61 and 0.68 for three measures of discount rates over a 5–10 week period.
4The set of potential questions used for the risk module included gains between $1 and $10 in increments
of $0.50, and sure amounts and losses varying ranging from $0.50 to $10 in increments of $0.10. Questions
were excluded if one choice was first order stochastically dominated for all values of the prior distribution.
5The questions for the time module were drawn from a question set consisting of monetary amounts
between $1 and $10, in $1 increments, and time periods of 0, 1, 3, 5, 7, 9, 10, 12, 16, 21, 28, 35, 42, 49, 56,
60, 70, 80, 90 days.
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not included in the denominator—reflecting the fact that the El-Gamal and Palfrey (1996)
KL criterion measures the divergence between model k and the other models.
In addition, some practical constraints were placed on the question procedure to account
for the survey environment and to ensure that the questions asked provided information
about all the parameters of interest. In the risk module, the first four questions were re-
stricted to be lotteries over gains in order to focus the procedure on obtaining a precise
estimate of ρ before moving onto estimates of λ. To make it harder for respondents to ma-
nipulate the procedure, the maximum prize was restricted to be no more than $7 in each
even numbered round. Questions were also selected as if monetary amounts were 3 times the
actual amounts offered in the lottery to improve discrimination of the risk and loss aversion
parameters rather than the consistency parameter µ. In the time module, the first five ques-
tions were restricted to the choice between payment on two dates in the future. In addition,
when considering two options in the future (that is, t1 > 0 and t2 > 0), individuals were
assumed to choose as if they have a fixed value of the present bias parameter (β=0.64, based
on the estimates from Tanaka et al. (2010)).
After receiving the survey responses, the individual-level estimates presented in the paper
were obtained by performing the Bayesian updating procedure on the answers to the ques-
tions selected by the procedure above. This re-estimation allowed us to use a more refined
prior, and also to use more of the information obtained during the risk module in estimating
individual discount factors. The re-estimation used a discrete uniform prior, consisting of
100 points. The range of the prior was constructed based on previous participant estimates
obtained by Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) and Frydman et al. (2011). We allow for values of
ρ between 0.2 and 1.7, for λ between 0 and 4.6, for δ (and β) between 0.2 and 1.0 and for
µ between 0 and 8.0. There was little evidence of present bias in the survey—possibly due
to the fact that points were, in general, not instantly convertible into consumption—and so
time preferences were re-estimated allowing for discounting only. In practice, however, we
found very little evidence of present bias either in the DOSE module or in the time MPLs.
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As such, the prior used to obtain estimates did not include a present bias parameter.
Implementing the survey through YouGov’s online platform precluded using DOSE to
choose questions in real time. Instead, simulated responses were used to map out all possible
sets of binary choices in advance. That tree was then used to route respondents through the
survey. Mapping such a tree with the 100 point discretized prior was infeasible given both
computational constraints and the limitations of YouGov’s interface (since mapping such a
tree over 20 questions would involve over 500,000 routes through the survey).
Given these constraints, question selection was implemented separately for the risk and
time modules, and used a coarser prior.6 To utilize the information about the curvature
of the utility function from the risk-loss module, respondents were assigned to one of ten
prior distributions over ρ, based on their estimated ρ from the risk-loss module. These ten
distributions focus on the mass points of the prior used in the risk preference module.
D Robustness Checks
This section presents extended survey results and robustness tests.
D.1 Robustness of Correlations with Economic Preferences
In this subsection we present extended versions of the correlation tables in Section 4, includ-
ing a wider range of individual characteristics and comparisons with alternative measures of
risk and time preferences.
The distribution of preferences for high cognitive ability participants differs significantly
from the rest of the population, as shown in Figure D.1. For each of the three economic
preferences, the low and medium cognitive ability participants appear quite similar—but
there is a first order stochastic dominance relation with high cognitive ability participants.
Further, as discussed in Section 4.2, there is no evidence that the correlations between
6The prior included 12 mass points for ρ, 20 for λ and 4 for µ.
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Figure D.1: Economic preferences among low and high cognitive ability participants are
clearly different.
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Notes: Figures display the cumulative density of each preference parameter in the Wave 1 survey. Low,
medium, and high cognitive ability are defined by the terciles of the distribution.
cognitive ability and preferences are driven by high cognitive ability individuals clustering
at values near risk- or loss-neutrality.
In Table D.1 we compare the correlations when using the DOSE measure of risk aversion
(column 1) and time preference (column 5) with the other risk and time measures in our
survey. For risk aversion these alternative measures included two MPL modules, one relating
to Willingness-to-Pay for a lottery (which we use in the main paper), and one relating to
Willingness-to-Accept, as well as a risky project measure (Gneezy and Potters, 1997). For
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time preferences, as discussed in Section 2, we included two MPLs as well as the DOSE
module.
The pattern of correlations is much stronger when using the DOSE measure than either
MPL measure. As discussed in Section 4.3, the weak correlations with the MPL (WTP)
measure are consistent with attenuation bias due to higher measurement error in the MPL.
The weak pattern of correlations with the MPL (WTA) measure could also be explained
by attenuation bias or could result from the WTA measure capturing a different dimension
of risk preferences to the other risk measures in our survey (see Chapman et al., 2017).
The risky project measure, which may suffer from less attenuation bias than the MPLs
due to its simplicity, identifies a similar pattern of correlations to the DOSE risk aversion
measure. The correlations between the risky project measure and individual characteristics
consistently have the same sign, degree of statistical significance and magnitude as those
with the DOSE estimates. The main exception are the correlations with cognitive ability,
where DOSE identifies much stronger correlations than the project measure.
Loss aversion is also correlated with other individual characteristics not presented in the
main text, as shown in Table D.2. More loss averse individuals are more likely to attend
church, less likely to be white, and more likely to own a home. Further, the two component
parts of our cognitive ability measure have similar correlations with each of the economic
preference variables, demonstrating that it is appropriate to combine the two.
The correlations with cognitive ability are robust to the inclusion of the other sociode-
mographic controls in Table 2—see Table D.3 and Table D.4. For each of the four preference
parameters, the first specification includes only the attributes—age and sex—that are not
potentially endogenous to cognitive ability. The second specification then includes the re-
maining variables including, of most interest, education and income. In the specifications in
Table D.3 all variables are included as continuous measures (except stock investor and male).
The coefficients are standardized, and so are comparable to the correlations in Table 2. In all
specifications the coefficient for cognitive ability is still strongly statistically significant and,
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Table D.1: Comparison of correlations between different risk and time measures and indi-
vidual characteristics
Risk Aversion Patience
DOSE MPL MPL Risky DOSE MPL
(WTP) (WTA) Project
Cognitive Ability -0.21∗∗∗ -0.04 0.01 -0.07∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.19∗∗∗
(.028) (.028) (.028) (.029) (.029) (.027)
IQ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.05 0.00 -0.07∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(.029) (.028) (.029) (.030) (.032) (.029)
CRT -0.18∗∗∗ -0.02 0.02 -0.05∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(.030) (.027) (.025) (.029) (.036) (.025)
Income -0.15∗∗∗ -0.06∗ 0.00 -0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗∗
(.034) (.034) (.031) (.035) (.034) (.032)
Education -0.10∗∗∗ -0.02 0.03 -0.09∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(.033) (.034) (.028) (.032) (.037) (.033)
Male -0.10∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ 0.01 -0.12∗∗∗ -0.02 0.02
(.032) (.030) (.030) (.032) (.035) (.034)
Age 0.02 0.05 -0.04 -0.02 0.18∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(.032) (.031) (.028) (.032) (.036) (.034)
Stock Investor -0.11∗∗∗ -0.06∗∗ -0.00 -0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ 0.09∗∗∗
(.029) (.029) (.026) (.030) (.031) (.030)
Non-white -0.07∗∗ 0.02 -0.04 -0.08∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(.032) (.030) (.030) (.032) (.035) (.034)
Own home 0.10∗∗∗ -0.01 0.01 -0.06∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(.033) (.032) (.032) (.034) (.037) (.038)
Employed -0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.09∗∗∗ 0.03 0.03
(.031) (.029) (.029) (.031) (.035) (.034)
Church Attendance 0.09∗∗∗ -0.02 0.04 -0.04 0.01 -0.03
(.032) (.029) (.030) (.031) (.034) (.035)
Marital Status -0.03 -0.02 -0.02 -0.01 -0.12∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗
(.033) (.031) (.031) (.032) (.037) (.036)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are calculated by
regressing the (standardized) preference parameter on each (standardized) individual characteristic, and are pre-
sented in parentheses.
compared to the other controls, large—although slightly lower than the simple correlations.
The results are similar when including all characteristics as categorical variables, as shown
in Table D.4. These specifications allow for potential non-monotonic relationships, as well
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Table D.2: Additional correlations between estimated DOSE parameters and individual
characteristics
Loss Risk Patience Choice
Aversion Aversion Consistency
(λ) (1− ρ) (δ) (µ)
Cognitive Ability 0.21∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(.030) (.028) (.029) (.026)
IQ 0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(.033) (.029) (.032) (.028)
CRT 0.19∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(.029) (.030) (.036) (.025)
Income 0.15∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.06∗
(.032) (.034) (.034) (.033)
Education 0.13∗∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(.032) (.033) (.037) (.032)
Male 0.08∗∗ -0.10∗∗∗ -0.02 0.01
(.033) (.032) (.035) (.033)
Age -0.10∗∗∗ 0.02 0.18∗∗∗ 0.05
(.033) (.032) (.036) (.036)
Stock Investor 0.06∗∗ -0.11∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ -0.02
(.031) (.029) (.031) (.032)
Non-white -0.14∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.05
(.033) (.033) (.037) (.038)
Own Home 0.06∗ -0.07∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.01
(.033) (.032) (.035) (.033)
Employed 0.06∗ -0.04 0.03 0.04
(.032) (.031) (.035) (.031)
Church Attendance -0.06∗ 0.09∗∗∗ 0.01 -0.02
(.033) (.032) (.034) (.032)
Marital Status 0.04 -0.03 -0.12∗∗∗ -0.07∗∗
(.035) (.033) (.037) (.033)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are calcu-
lated by regressing the (standardized) preference parameter on each (standardized) individual character-
istic, and are presented in parentheses.
as having the added advantage of allowing us to include participants that did not report
their income. The relationship with cognitive ability appears to be monotonic although,
interestingly, the association with loss aversion seems limited to the top tercile of ability.
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Table D.3: The correlations between cognitive ability and economic preferences are robust
to the inclusion of demographic controls.
Loss Aversion Risk Aversion Patience Choice Consistency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cognitive Ability 0.20*** 0.15*** -0.19*** -0.17*** 0.21*** 0.17*** 0.16*** 0.14***
(0.031) (0.034) (0.028) (0.033) (0.028) (0.031) (0.028) (0.029)
Male 0.05 0.07 -0.12** -0.15** -0.12* -0.14* -0.05 -0.04
(0.067) (0.066) (0.063) (0.067) (0.067) (0.073) (0.068) (0.065)
Age -0.09*** -0.09** -0.00 0.00 0.19*** 0.18*** 0.06* 0.03
(0.032) (0.037) (0.031) (0.036) (0.035) (0.041) (0.035) (0.040)
Education 0.06 -0.00 0.10** 0.05
(0.038) (0.036) (0.044) (0.033)
Income 0.08** -0.09** 0.04 0.05
(0.036) (0.036) (0.037) (0.038)
Stock Investor 0.05 -0.08 -0.07 -0.20**
(0.081) (0.074) (0.079) (0.097)
Obs. 2000 1740 2000 1740 2000 1740 2000 1740
Adj. R2 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.07 0.07 0.03 0.03
Note: Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All contin-
uous variables are standardized. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses. Missing
observations are due to unreported incomes.
The results in Table D.3 and Table D.4 suggest that much of the correlation between
education and both risk and loss aversion is explained by cognitive ability. To test that
it is cognitive ability, and not one of the other controls, that weakens the association we
carry out additional specifications adding the variables one at a time—see Table D.5. For
each preference parameter, we start by adding education and income separately, then both
together and, finally, add cognitive ability. It is only when cognitive ability is added that
the magnitude of the coefficient with education diminishes significantly—suggesting that
cognitive ability jointly determines educational outcomes and these two preferences.
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Table D.4: Participants in top tercile of cognitive ability are more loss averse.
Loss Aversion Risk Aversion Patience Choice Consistency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cognitive Ability:
Middle Tercile -0.02 -0.03 -0.18** -0.17** 0.18** 0.17** 0.25*** 0.24***
(.082) (.080) (.078) (.077) (.082) (.080) (.086) (.083)
Top Tercile 0.35*** 0.27*** -0.48*** -0.41*** 0.48*** 0.38*** 0.38*** 0.35***
(0.083) (.085) (.071) (.076) (.080) (.083) (.078) (.076)
Age:
36–50 -0.23** -0.23** 0.04 0.06 0.15 0.14 0.08 0.05
(0.106) (0.103) (0.095) (0.094) (0.110) (0.109) (0.098) (0.096)
51–64 -0.32*** -0.35*** 0.07 0.12 0.34*** 0.32*** 0.19** 0.20**
(0.092) (0.093) (0.093) (0.092) (0.098) (0.099) (0.095) (0.099)
65+ -0.26*** -0.28*** 0.02 0.04 0.46*** 0.50*** 0.11 0.13
(0.095) (0.099) (0.094) (0.096) (0.098) (0.101) (0.100) (0.106)
Male 0.08 0.08 -0.13** -0.12* -0.11* -0.10 -0.05 -0.04
(0.067) (0.065) (0.062) (0.062) (0.066) (0.064) (0.067) (0.065)
Education:
Some College -0.02 -0.08 0.30*** 0.03
(0.077) (0.075) (0.085) (0.076)
4-year College 0.15* -0.06 0.26*** 0.16**
(0.085) (0.079) (0.087) (0.077)
Income:
2nd Quartile -0.03 0.08 -0.12 0.12
(0.089) (0.094) (0.102) (0.096)
3rd Quartile 0.20** 0.03 -0.09 0.07
(0.092) (0.090) (0.109) (0.091)
4th Quartile 0.22** -0.21** 0.14 0.05
(0.100) (0.096) (0.093) (0.099)
Unreported 0.34*** -0.07 0.00 -0.25**
(0.119) (0.113) (0.108) (0.121)
Stock Investor 0.06 -0.12* -0.01 -0.19**
(0.074) (0.068) (0.071) (0.088)
Obs. 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000 2000
Adj. R2 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.06 0.06 0.08 0.03 0.04
Note: All dependent variables are standardized. Robust standard errors are displayed in paren-
theses.
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Table D.6: Correlations with individual characteristics are similar when removing fastest
50% of respondents on entire survey.
Loss Risk Patience Choice
Aversion Aversion Consistency
(λ) (1− ρ) (δ) (µ)
Cognitive Ability 0.22∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.039) (0.043) (0.035)
IQ 0.20∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ 0.09∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.040) (0.050) (0.036)
CRT 0.18∗∗∗ -0.18∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.044) (0.040) (0.035)
Income 0.11∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗
(0.045) (0.047) (0.045) (0.039)
Education 0.07 -0.14∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.044) (0.043) (0.039)
Male 0.08∗ -0.12∗∗∗ -0.04 0.02
(0.043) (0.045) (0.051) (0.043)
Age -0.08∗ 0.04 0.18∗∗∗ -0.01
(0.047) (0.047) (0.057) (0.045)
Stock Investor 0.13∗∗∗ -0.13∗∗∗ 0.08∗ -0.02
(0.043) (0.042) (0.046) (0.042)
Non-white -0.16∗∗∗ 0.09∗ -0.18∗∗∗ -0.00
(0.045) (0.048) (0.055) (0.047)
Own Home 0.07∗ -0.08∗ 0.11∗∗ 0.05
(0.044) (0.044) (0.052) (0.045)
Employed 0.08∗∗ -0.04 -0.01 0.07∗
(0.043) (0.043) (0.051) (0.039)
Church Attendance 0.00 0.08∗ -0.01 0.06
(0.044) (0.045) (0.050) (0.045)
Marital Status 0.02 -0.00 -0.14∗∗∗ -0.05
(0.048) (0.046) (0.059) (0.043)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are calcu-
lated by regressing the (standardized) preference parameter on each (standardized) individual character-
istic, and are presented in parentheses.
The next four tables show that the correlations between DOSE and the other character-
istics are also robust to removing the fastest 50% of participants on the survey (Tables D.6
and D.7) or on the DOSE module (Tables D.8 and D.9).
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Table D.7: Correlations with individual characteristics are similar when removing fastest
50% of respondents on entire survey and including controls.
Loss Aversion Risk Aversion Patience Choice Consistency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cognitive Ability 0.21*** 0.18*** -0.19*** -0.12** 0.20*** 0.18*** 0.17*** 0.14***
(0.039) (0.047) (0.041) (0.048) (0.042) (0.046) (0.037) (0.041)
Male 0.07 0.11 -0.16* -0.22** -0.15 -0.20* -0.03 -0.10
(0.085) (0.093) (0.087) (0.092) (0.097) (0.105) (0.087) (0.089)
Age -0.05 -0.09* 0.01 0.02 0.20*** 0.20*** 0.01 -0.05
(0.045) (0.055) (0.047) (0.052) (0.057) (0.066) (0.045) (0.048)
Education -0.02 -0.03 0.11** 0.06
(0.046) (0.052) (0.051) (0.042)
Income 0.03 -0.06 0.03 0.09**
(0.051) (0.050) (0.051) (0.043)
Stock Investor 0.21* -0.12 -0.11 -0.21**
(0.109) (0.096) (0.107) (0.101)
Obs. 993 861 993 861 993 861 993 861
Adj. R2 0.05 0.07 0.05 0.05 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.04
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All dependent
variables are standardized. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
The relationship between expected value maximizing choices and cognitive ability dis-
cussed in Section 4.2 is robust to controlling for other socio-demographic characteristics, as
showin in Table D.10. Each observation in these regressions is an individual choice, with the
(binary) dependent variable indicating whether a participant chose an option that maximized
expected value. Specifications (1)–(4) relate to lotteries with losses, while specifications (5)–
(8) relate to those with only gains. The omitted category for cognitive ability is low cognitive
ability individuals.
The results of the regressions clearly reflect the pattern of choices presented in Figure 5.
High cognitive ability participants are consistently more likely to choose an option with the
highest expected value if that option involves accepting a lottery over gains or rejecting a
lottery over losses. However, they are less likely to do so when the EV-maximizing option
involves either accepting lottery over losses (that is, one with negative expected value) or
accepting a sure amount over gains. This finding is robust to including controls for individual
characteristics (specifications (2) and (6)), and question characteristics (specifications (3) and
(7)). Finally, in the last specification, we allow for the relationship between education and
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Table D.8: Correlations with individual characteristics are similar when removing fastest
50% of respondents on DOSE module.
Loss Risk Patience Choice
Aversion Aversion Consistency
(λ) (1− ρ) (δ) (µ)
Cognitive Ability 0.26∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.039) (0.041) (0.036)
IQ 0.25∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗
(0.037) (0.040) (0.049) (0.036)
CRT 0.19∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗ 0.22∗∗∗ 0.14∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.045) (0.040) (0.036)
Income 0.11∗∗∗ -0.12∗∗∗ 0.10∗∗ 0.08∗
(0.044) (0.046) (0.046) (0.041)
Education 0.13∗∗∗ -0.14∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.09∗
(0.041) (0.039) (0.045) (0.047)
Male 0.08∗ -0.11∗∗∗ -0.04 -0.01
(0.042) (0.044) (0.050) (0.047)
Age -0.05 0.07 0.19∗∗∗ 0.03
(0.047) (0.046) (0.056) (0.057)
Stock Investor 0.12∗∗∗ -0.09∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗ -0.03
(0.039) (0.037) (0.037) (0.040)
Non-white -0.18∗∗∗ 0.12∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.044) (0.047) (0.056) (0.053)
Own Home 0.08∗ -0.11∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.00
(0.043) (0.043) (0.051) (0.048)
Employed 0.12∗∗∗ -0.03 0.02 0.04
(0.042) (0.041) (0.049) (0.043)
Church Attendance -0.03 0.05 0.03 -0.03
(0.043) (0.045) (0.049) (0.046)
Marital Status -0.02 0.00 -0.18∗∗∗ -0.06
(0.047) (0.046) (0.056) (0.049)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are calcu-
lated by regressing the (standardized) preference parameter on each (standardized) individual character-
istic, and are presented in parentheses.
making an EV-maximizing choice to vary according to whether that choice is a lottery or
not. Again, the relationship with cognitive ability is largely unchanged.
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Table D.9: Correlations with individual characteristics are similar when removing fastest
50% of respondents on DOSE module and including controls.
Loss Aversion Risk Aversion Patience Choice Consistency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cognitive Ability 0.26*** 0.20*** -0.19*** -0.16*** 0.23*** 0.19*** 0.16*** 0.11***
(0.038) (0.043) (0.039) (0.049) (0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.035)
Male 0.05 0.14 -0.13 -0.14 -0.16* -0.20** -0.07 -0.10
(0.083) (0.091) (0.084) (0.092) (0.091) (0.102) (0.098) (0.089)
Age -0.01 -0.06 0.04 0.01 0.22*** 0.18*** 0.05 -0.05
(0.045) (0.054) (0.046) (0.053) (0.055) (0.065) (0.058) (0.052)
Education 0.05 -0.08* 0.09* 0.04
(0.045) (0.048) (0.053) (0.042)
Income 0.01 -0.03 0.01 0.07*
(0.048) (0.050) (0.049) (0.039)
Stock Investor 0.12 -0.02 0.03 -0.18**
(0.097) (0.080) (0.083) (0.087)
Obs. 1012 875 1012 875 1012 875 1012 875
Adj. R2 0.07 0.08 0.05 0.05 0.09 0.08 0.02 0.03
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All dependent
variables are standardized. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
D.2 Choice Consistency and Response Time
We now show that that controlling for choice consistency helps identify a pattern of corre-
lations even when restricting the sample to those answering very fast—and so who might
be thought to be paying little attention. In the left hand panel of Figure D.2 we show the
pattern of correlations restricting the sample to first those answering the risk MPL mod-
ule quickly and in the right hand panel we present the correlations for those answering the
whole survey quickly (quickly being defined as below the respective median). In both cases
we compare the correlations for all participants to those in the high consistency group.
In both panels there is more evidence of correlations after restricting the sample to high
consistency participants. The magnitude of the correlations in frequently higher, and several
emerge as statistically significant once only high consistency participants are considered. The
magnitude of the correlations is, in fact, similar to those in Figure 6, although the standard
errors are larger (explained by the fact the sample is half as large). The choice consistency
measure appears, then, to be distinguishing participants that answer accurately but rapidly—
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Table D.10: High cognitive ability participants make fewer EV-maximizing decisions for
lotteries with negative expected value.
DV = Made Expected-Value-Maximizing Choice
Lotteries with Losses Lotteries with Only Gains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EV≤Sure Amount
x Medium Cognitive Ability 0.062*** 0.064*** 0.041** 0.040** -0.065** -0.073** -0.075** -0.074**
(0.023) (0.023) (0.020) (0.020) (0.032) (0.032) (0.031) (0.031)
x High Cognitive Ability 0.171*** 0.168*** 0.114*** 0.104*** -0.044 -0.063** -0.070** -0.066**
(0.025) (0.025) (0.023) (0.023) (0.031) (0.031) (0.030) (0.031)
EV>Sure Amount 0.264*** 0.269*** 0.152*** 0.159*** -0.289*** -0.292*** -0.244*** -0.267***
(0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.026) (0.025) (0.025) (0.029) (0.033)
x Medium Cognitive Ability 0.013 0.013 -0.010 -0.009 0.040** 0.036** 0.027 0.026
(0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.017)
x High Cognitive Ability -0.088*** -0.087*** -0.107*** -0.101*** 0.120*** 0.104*** 0.087*** 0.084***
(0.018) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018) (0.017) (0.018) (0.018) (0.018)
Some College 0.007 0.010 -0.001 -0.000 0.001 -0.042
(0.014) (0.012) (0.020) (0.016) (0.015) (0.030)
x EV>Sure Amount 0.018 0.066*
(0.029) (0.035)
4-year College 0.015 0.022 0.066*** 0.020 0.026 0.017
(0.015) (0.014) (0.024) (0.017) (0.016) (0.032)
x EV≤Sure Amount -0.069** 0.014
(0.031) (0.037)
Age (Standardized) 0.035*** -0.002 -0.002 0.003 -0.012* -0.012*
(0.006) (0.006) (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.007)
Male 0.012 0.010 0.010 0.004 0.003 0.004
(0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.013) (0.013) (0.013)
Income: 2nd Quartile 0.032** 0.031** 0.031** 0.058*** 0.057*** 0.057***
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.018) (0.018)
Income: 3rd Quartile -0.003 0.000 -0.001 0.033* 0.035* 0.036*
(0.016) (0.015) (0.015) (0.019) (0.019) (0.019)
Income: 4th Quartile -0.011 -0.005 -0.005 0.067*** 0.068*** 0.067***
(0.017) (0.016) (0.016) (0.021) (0.020) (0.020)
Income: Unstated -0.006 -0.010 -0.010 0.022 0.020 0.020
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.021) (0.021)
Lottery Prize ($) 0.031*** 0.031*** -0.004 -0.004
(0.002) (0.002) (0.004) (0.004)
|EV - Sure Amount| ($) -0.021*** -0.020*** -0.023*** -0.023***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.007) (0.007)
Response Time: Quartile 2 0.144*** 0.143*** 0.061*** 0.062***
(0.013) (0.013) (0.020) (0.020)
Response Time: Quartile 3 0.220*** 0.221*** 0.082*** 0.084***
(0.014) (0.014) (0.019) (0.019)
Response Time: Quartile 4 0.216*** 0.217*** 0.130*** 0.131***
(0.015) (0.015) (0.020) (0.020)
Obs. 11154 11154 11154 11154 8846 8846 8846 8846
Adj. R2 0.04 0.04 0.10 0.11 0.04 0.05 0.06 0.06
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are clustered by
participant and displayed in parentheses.
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Figure D.2: Accounting for choice consistency leads to a clearer pattern of correlations even
after removing very fast responses.
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Notes: The left panel includes only participants below the median response time on the risk MPL module.
The right panel includes only participants below the median response time on the entire survey. “High
Consistency” refers to those with choice consistency above the median. The survey contained two MPL
measures of risk preference. Correlations are estimated by stacking the two and clustering standard errors
by participant.
whose responses include meaningful information—from those that answer quickly due to a
lack of care or attention.
Finally, note that the relationship between cognitive ability and response times for both
MPL and DOSE is similar when analyzing by cognitive ability tercile (see Figure D.3), as
when we do so by quartile (see Figure 8).
Online Appendix–20
Figure D.3: Participants in bottom cognitive ability tercile take longer for MPL questions,
but not DOSE.
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Notes: DOSE module includes 20 questions addressing both risk and time preferences. MPL module includes
two MPLs assessing time preferences, which was the first MPL module on the survey. Respondents with
response times of over 15 minutes for either module are excluded.
D.3 Results using Wave 2 Survey Sample
The survey results are similar when using data from the second wave of the survey. As
shown in Tables D.11 and D.12, the correlations with other sociodemographic variables
are of similar magnitude and direction to those in the first wave. Similarly, the pattern of
choices of low and high cognitive ability participants follow a similar pattern (Figure D.4
and Table D.13.
The only notable exception is that restricting the Wave 2 sample to high consistency
participants does not recover a statistically significant correlation between the risk aversion
MPL measure and cognitive ability (see Figure D.5)—a difference that is probably explained
by differential attrition. The first and third panels of the figure are very similar to those
in Figure 6: the DOSE risk aversion estimates are consistently correlated with individual
characteristics, and the MPL measure is not. The middle panel shows that there is still a
pattern of higher correlations between the MPL measure and other individual characteristics
after removing inconsistent participants; however the correlation with cognitive ability (and
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Figure D.4: Pattern of individual choices is the similar in the Wave 2 data.
20%
40%
60%
80%
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 C
ho
se
 L
ot
te
ry
−$4 −$2 $0 $2 $4
Expected Value − Sure Amount
Lotteries with Losses
20%
40%
60%
80%
Pr
ob
ab
ili
ty
 C
ho
se
 L
ot
te
ry
−$2 $0 $2 $4
Expected Value − Sure Amount
Lotteries with Only Gains
Low Cognitive Ability High Cognitive Ability
Notes: Figure displays the Nadaraya-Watson estimator (local mean smoothing) estimator (bandwidth 1)
with Epanechnikov kernel. Grey dotted lines represent 95% confidence intervals, constructed with 10,000
clustered bootstrap replications. “Lotteries with losses” identifies questions where participants chose between
$0 for sure and a 50:50 lottery between a gain and a loss (both amounts varying). “Lotteries with only gains”
identifies questions where participants chose between a varying, strictly positive, sure amount and a 50:50
lottery between a varying gain and $0. Participants were asked a personalized question sequence, and so the
set of possible choices varied across individuals. High and low cognitive ability refer to the top and bottom
terciles respectively.
also stock ownership) is not distinguishable from zero at conventional levels. The reason
appears to be that lower cognitive ability is associated with higher drop out rates between
survey waves. In contrast, none of the DOSE measures—or education where we do see a
higher correlation—is correlated with attrition. The reduced variability in the sample then
reduces the ability to identify a genuine correlation.
D.4 Classification of Participants by DOSE
The DOSE estimates clearly capture participants’ choices, providing evidence that our results
are not an artefact of functional form—see Table D.14. Here participants are classified
according to their estimated parameter values—for instance, a participant is “loss averse,
risk averse” if they have both λ > 1 and ρ < 1—and we examine how the frequency of
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Table D.11: Correlations between estimated DOSE parameters and individual characteristics
in Wave 2 data are similar to those in Wave 1.
Loss Risk Patience Choice
Aversion Aversion Consistency
(λ) (1− ρ) (δ) (µ)
Cognitive Ability 0.26∗∗∗ -0.24∗∗∗ 0.25∗∗∗ 0.18∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.032) (0.031) (0.034)
IQ 0.22∗∗∗ -0.20∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.033) (0.035) (0.031) (0.035)
CRT 0.23∗∗∗ -0.21∗∗∗ 0.23∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗
(0.035) (0.033) (0.032) (0.034)
Income 0.12∗∗∗ -0.19∗∗∗ 0.20∗∗∗ 0.15∗∗∗
(0.039) (0.041) (0.048) (0.040)
Education 0.14∗∗∗ -0.15∗∗∗ 0.21∗∗∗ 0.17∗∗∗
(0.034) (0.035) (0.040) (0.036)
Male 0.06 -0.04 0.01 0.01
(0.040) (0.040) (0.043) (0.042)
Age -0.11∗∗∗ 0.00 0.08∗ 0.08∗
(0.042) (0.040) (0.047) (0.043)
Stock Investor 0.04 -0.16∗∗∗ 0.16∗∗∗ 0.08∗∗
(0.035) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037)
Non-white -0.13∗∗∗ 0.11∗∗∗ -0.22∗∗∗ -0.16∗∗∗
(0.044) (0.041) (0.049) (0.048)
Own Home 0.00 -0.10∗∗∗ 0.13∗∗∗ 0.05
(0.041) (0.040) (0.044) (0.043)
Employed -0.01 -0.06 0.11∗∗∗ 0.06
(0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.041)
Church Attendance 0.00 0.04 -0.03 0.01
(0.040) (0.040) (0.039) (0.039)
Marital Status 0.09∗∗ -0.03 -0.06 -0.12∗∗∗
(0.042) (0.042) (0.043) (0.043)
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are calcu-
lated by regressing the (standardized) preference parameter on each (standardized) individual character-
istic, and are presented in parentheses.
lotteries accepted varies according to the expected value (relative to a sure amount) and
whether the lottery involved a loss. The pattern of behavior is as would be expected. Loss
tolerant participants nearly always choose lotteries with losses, and risk loving participants
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Table D.12: Correlations between cognitive ability and economic preferences in Wave 2 are
similar after including demographic controls.
Loss Aversion Risk Aversion Patience Choice Consistency
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
Cognitive Ability 0.25*** 0.22*** -0.24*** -0.18*** 0.26*** 0.19*** 0.19*** 0.15***
(0.035) (0.042) (0.033) (0.035) (0.034) (0.035) (0.037) (0.037)
Male 0.04 0.10 -0.02 -0.04 -0.04 -0.02 -0.04 -0.11
(0.079) (0.082) (0.078) (0.077) (0.083) (0.084) (0.085) (0.089)
Age -0.09** -0.05 -0.02 0.02 0.11** 0.04 0.09** 0.09**
(0.040) (0.042) (0.038) (0.042) (0.046) (0.052) (0.042) (0.045)
Education 0.08* -0.03 0.08* 0.09**
(0.040) (0.043) (0.043) (0.039)
Income 0.04 -0.09** 0.08* 0.07*
(0.041) (0.043) (0.049) (0.043)
Stock Investor -0.06 -0.21** 0.11 -0.05
(0.080) (0.096) (0.098) (0.092)
Obs. 1465 1271 1465 1271 1465 1271 1465 1271
Adj. R2 0.07 0.08 0.06 0.08 0.07 0.09 0.04 0.06
Note: Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. All
continuous variables are standardized. Robust standard errors are displayed in parentheses.
Missing observations are due to unreported incomes.
Figure D.5: Correlations with MPL and DOSE risk aversion measures using Wave 2 data.
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Notes: Figure displays correlations between the DOSE and MPL measures of risk aversion and individual
characteristics. The left hand panel includes all participants in the Wave 2 survey, while the middle (right)
panel restricts the sample to those above (below) the median in the choice consistency variable. The survey
contained two MPL measures of risk preference. Correlations are estimated by stacking the two and clustering
standard errors by participant.
nearly always choose lotteries over gains. Loss averse and risk averse participants, in contrast,
are much less likely to accept such lotteries.
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Table D.13: High cognitive ability participants make fewer EV-maximizing decisions for
lotteries with negative expected value using Wave 2 data.
DV = Made Expected-Value-Maximizing Choice
Lotteries with Losses Lotteries with Only Gains
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8)
EV≤Sure Amount
x Medium Cognitive Ability 0.056** 0.058** 0.049** 0.047** -0.032 -0.036 -0.037 -0.033
(0.026) (0.026) (0.024) (0.024) (0.038) (0.038) (0.037) (0.037)
x High Cognitive Ability 0.172*** 0.171*** 0.127*** 0.120*** 0.018 0.008 0.002 0.011
(0.031) (0.032) (0.029) (0.030) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.041)
EV>Sure Amount 0.260*** 0.261*** 0.151*** 0.156*** -0.272*** -0.273*** -0.230*** -0.246***
(0.027) (0.027) (0.027) (0.031) (0.032) (0.032) (0.037) (0.042)
x Medium Cognitive Ability -0.035 -0.032 -0.037* -0.036 0.036* 0.032 0.031 0.029
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.020) (0.020) (0.019) (0.019)
x High Cognitive Ability -0.115*** -0.109*** -0.124*** -0.120*** 0.138*** 0.127*** 0.115*** 0.110***
(0.023) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Some College 0.023 0.020 0.015 0.025 0.022 0.005
(0.017) (0.016) (0.025) (0.019) (0.018) (0.037)
x EV>Sure Amount 0.008 0.025
(0.036) (0.042)
4-year College -0.018 -0.016 0.011 0.013 0.012 -0.018
(0.018) (0.017) (0.028) (0.021) (0.020) (0.040)
x EV≤Sure Amount -0.040 0.045
(0.037) (0.044)
Age (Standardized) 0.034*** -0.005 -0.005 0.003 -0.008 -0.008
(0.007) (0.007) (0.007) (0.008) (0.009) (0.009)
Male 0.004 -0.000 -0.001 -0.003 -0.004 -0.004
(0.013) (0.012) (0.012) (0.016) (0.015) (0.015)
Income: 2nd Quartile 0.009 0.008 0.009 -0.013 -0.013 -0.013
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.023) (0.022) (0.022)
Income: 3rd Quartile 0.003 0.008 0.008 0.002 0.001 0.001
(0.020) (0.018) (0.018) (0.022) (0.022) (0.022)
Income: 4th Quartile 0.045** 0.048*** 0.048** 0.045* 0.043* 0.043*
(0.020) (0.019) (0.019) (0.025) (0.024) (0.024)
Income: Unstated 0.009 0.003 0.003 -0.003 -0.004 -0.003
(0.023) (0.022) (0.022) (0.025) (0.025) (0.025)
Lottery Prize ($) 0.030*** 0.030*** -0.002 -0.002
(0.003) (0.003) (0.005) (0.005)
|EV - Sure Amount| ($) -0.018*** -0.018*** -0.026*** -0.026***
(0.004) (0.004) (0.008) (0.008)
Response Time: Quartile 2 0.136*** 0.136*** 0.049** 0.048**
(0.015) (0.015) (0.023) (0.023)
Response Time: Quartile 3 0.207*** 0.208*** 0.095*** 0.096***
(0.016) (0.016) (0.023) (0.023)
Response Time: Quartile 4 0.198*** 0.199*** 0.082*** 0.082***
(0.018) (0.018) (0.025) (0.025)
Obs. 8151 8151 8151 8151 6499 6499 6499 6499
Adj. R2 0.03 0.04 0.09 0.09 0.05 0.05 0.06 0.06
Notes: ∗∗∗, ∗∗, ∗ denote statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% level. Standard errors are clustered by
participant and displayed in parentheses.
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Table D.14: DOSE classification reflects clear pattern of choices.
% Lotteries Accepted
Lotteries with Losses Lotteries with Only Gains
EV≤Sure EV>Sure EV≤Sure EV>Sure
Classification by DOSE
Loss Averse, Risk Averse 12% 48% 4% 42%
Loss Averse, Risk Loving 2% 51% 53% 96%
Loss Tolerant, Risk Averse 80% 98% 4% 43%
Loss Tolerant, Risk Loving 81% 100% 75% 97%
Notes: The table displays the unweighted percentage of lotteries accepted, categorizing participants ac-
cording to their estimated DOSE parameters. “EV”=Expected Value of lottery and “Sure”= the sure
amount offered in each lottery.
E Parameter Recovery Procedure
This section provides full details of our simulation procedure, and shows that the results in
Section 3.2 may underestimate the benefits of DOSE relative to other elicitation methods.
The first subsection provides a detailed explanation of the procedure used to simulate DOSE,
the double MPL, and Lottery Menu methods. To understand whether our assumptions about
the level of noise in the survey are reasonable, we then compare simulated choices to real
survey data. The simulation appears to underestimate the level of noise in the survey MPL.
E.1 Simulation Procedure
Simulation Dataset A dataset of 10,000 simulated individuals was generated as follows.
First, we estimated the 140 question DOSE procedure on the 120 participants from Sokol-
Hessner et al. (2009) and Frydman et al. (2011). We then aggregated the 120 individual
posterior distributions to form a joint probability distribution over the three parameters ρ,
λ and µ. The 10,000 participants were then drawn from the resulting distribution.
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Table E.1: Choices in Simulation of Lottery Menu Procedure
Low High CRRA Estimated
Prize Prize Range ρ
Lottery 1 4.00 4.00 ρ < −2.46 0.20
Lottery 2 3.43 5.14 −2.46 < ρ < −0.16 0.20
Lottery 3 2.86 6.29 −0.16 < ρ < 0.29 0.20
Lottery 4 2.29 7.43 0.29 < ρ < 0.50 0.40
Lottery 5 1.71 8.57 0.50 < ρ < 1.00 0.75
Lottery 6 0.29 10.00 1 < ρ 1.00
Notes: Lottery menu choices taken from Dave et al. (2010), adjusted so that maximum prize is $10. “CRRA
range” is the implied range of CRRA coeffcients implied by the choice of each lottery. “Estimated ρ” is the
estimated value of the CRRA coefficient associated with the choice of each lottery used in the calculation
of expected inaccuracy.
DOSE Simulation We simulate a 20 question DOSE procedure for each individual, with
each binary choice made probabilistically according to the logit probability (2). The possible
question space included 760 questions, allowing for gains in $0.25 increments up to $10, and
losses in $0.5 increments up to $10.
Lottery Menu In the lottery menu procedure, developed by Eckel and Grossman (2002),
participants are offered a choice between multiple lotteries over gains. We calculate the
expected measurement error for the menu of six 50:50 lotteries presented in Table E.1. This
implementation is based on the menu used by Dave et al. (2010), adjusted so that the largest
prize is $10 (for comparability with the other elicitation procedures). The first lottery is a
safe option (it has zero variance), while the subsequent lotteries increase in both expected
value and variance.
The choice of lottery implies a range of possible CRRA coefficients, as shown in the
penultimate column of Table E.1. For lotteries 2-5 we estimate the estimated CRRA coef-
ficient ρˆ as the midpoint of this range. Since the midpoint is undefined for lotteries 1 and
6, for these lotteries we use the end-point of the range. To ensure comparability with the
DOSE estimates, we then truncate the estimated parameters to the range defined by the
Sokol-Hessner-Frydman distribution.
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The procedure for the simulation was as follows. Consider a menu over a set of lotteries
l1, l2, ..., lL. We define a probability distribution over the set of lotteries by assuming that
individuals make a series of binary choices in which they compare the set of lotteries in
order. That is, they first compare lottery 1 with lottery 2, making a choice according to the
logit probability. They then compare the winner of that choice with lottery 3, and then the
winner of the latter choice with lottery 4. The procedure is repeated until lottery L.
We define a probability distribution over the full lottery menu for each participant i as
follows. For two lotteries l, k let qil,k be the probability that i chooses l when faced with a
binary choice between l and k. This probability is defined by the logit function (2), and as
such depends on the participant’s value of ρ and µ; for simplicity we do not display these
parameters or the i index in the following. Define the probability that lottery l is chosen
after L choices as pLl . Then p
1
1 = q1,2 and for all other l, L:
pLl =
l−1∑
k=1
ql,kp
l−1
k ×
L∏
m=l+1
ql,m
The probability distribution over the choice from the set of lotteries is then {pL1 , pL2 , ..., pLL}.
Defining ρˆl as the estimated CRRA coefficient associated with a choice of lottery l, the
expected inaccuracy is given by:
E[|ρˆ− ρ|] =
L∑
l=1
pLl × |ρˆl − ρ|
We also implemented an alternative simulation procedure for the Lottery Menu. Under
this alternative, choice occurred according to to a multinomial logit probability distribution.
That is, for each possible choice k = 1, ..., 6:
Prob(Choice = k) =
exp(EUk)
µ∑6
l=1 exp(EUl)
µ
where EUk is the expected utility of lottery k.
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Table E.2: Hypothetical MPL 1 used to estimate ρ
Left Hand Right Hand CRRA Estimated
Choice Choice Range ρ
50% of $0, 50% of $10 $0 n.a. n.a.
50% of $0, 50% of $10 $1 ρ < 0.30 0.23
...
... 0.30 < ρ < 0.43 0.37
...
... 0.43 < ρ < 0.58 0.50
...
... 0.58 < ρ < 0.76 0.66
...
... 0.76 < ρ < 1.00 1.57
...
... 1.00 < ρ < 1.36 1.16
...
... 1.36 < ρ < 1.94 1.61
...
... 1.94 < ρ < 3.11 1.66
50% of $0, 50% of $10 $9 3.11 < ρ < 6.58 1.66
50% of $0, 50% of $10 $10 6.58 < ρ 1.66
Notes: “CRRA range” is the implied range of CRRA coeffcients implied by the choice of each lottery. “Estimated
ρ” is the estimated value of the CRRA coefficient associated with the choice of each lottery used in the calculation
of expected inaccuracy. Neither value is defined in the first row because the design does not allow the right hand
side to be selected.
The estimated inaccuracy of the Lottery Menu procedure is significantly higher under
this alternative procedure. Drawing the consistency parameter at random (as in Table 1),
the average inaccuracy for the risk aversion parameter is 94%, compared to 35% under the
previous procedure. Further, with this alternative procedure the Lottery Menu estimates
are inaccurate for the very inconsistent participants too—at the lowest consistency ventile,
the average inaccuracy is 139% (for the highest ventile, it is 59%).
Double Multiple Price List (MPL)
We calculate the expected inaccuracy for the double MPL method using two hypothetical
MPLs. MPL 1 offers participants a choice between a fixed 50:50 lottery between $0 and $10
and a series of fixed amounts. This MPL is used to elicit the estimate of the CRRA coefficient
ρ. MPL 2 offers participants a choice between a 50:50 lottery between a loss of $10 and a
gain of $10 and a series of fixed amounts. This second MPL is used to obtain the estimate
of the loss aversion parameter λ. In both MPLs we enforce (in-line with the implementation
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Table E.3: Hypothetical MPL 2 used to estimate λ
Left hand Right hand
choice choice
50% of -$10, 50% of $10 -$10
50% of -$10, 50% of $10 -$9
...
...
...
...
50% of -$10, 50% of $10 $9
50% of -$10, 50% of $10 $10
in the surveys) that individuals could only switch once, and that individuals do not choose
dominated options: the left hand side of MPL (the lottery) is chosen in the first row and the
right hand side (the fixed amount) is chosen in the last row.
The row in which a participant first chooses the fixed amount (the right hand side) in
MPL 1 implies a range of certainty equivalents and CRRA coefficients, as shown in Table E.2.
We use the certainty equivalent at the midpoint of this range and the associated CRRA
coefficient.
Similarly, the row in which a participant first chooses the fixed amount (the right hand
side) of MPL 2 implies a range of certainty equivalents, as shown in Table E.3. We use the
certainty equivalent at the midpoint of this range and use the estimated CRRA coefficient ρˆ
estimated in MPL 1 to obtain the estimated loss aversion parameter, λˆ. For comparability
with the DOSE estimates, we truncate the range of λˆ and ρˆ to match the range of the prior
used in the DOSE procedure.
The procedure for simulating behavior on these two MPLs was as follows. For each row
r, the probability that a simulated individual defined by the parameter vector (ρ, λ, µ) first
chooses the right hand side of the MPL in row r is calculated. This probability is defined by
the logit probability (see (2)) comparing the lottery to the fixed amount offered in row r. To
translate these binary choices into a probability distribution over the set of rows in the MPL
we assume that individuals work either sequentially down or up an MPL, each with 50%
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probability. Suppose they work down the MPL. Then they first consider the choice between
the lottery and the fixed amount in the first row in which they can choose the fixed amount
(row 2 in our implementation). If they choose the fixed amount, they will always prefer the
fixed amount lower in the MPL: thus this row is the “switching row”. If, on the other hand,
they prefer the lottery then they will move to the next row and consider the next binary
choice. Alternatively, individuals may choose to work up the MPL by first considering the
bottom row of the MPL, then the second-bottom, etc.
Now consider a MPL with R rows in which an individual can switch. Define the proba-
bility that the lottery is chosen in row r by individual i as qir. This probability is defined by
ρ, µ and, when losses are involved, λ. For simplicity we suppress the i indices. Define the
probability row r is the switching row working down the MPL as pDr , and working up the
MPL as pUr . Then these probabilities are given by:
pDr = (1− qr)
r−1∏
s=1
qs and
pUr = (qr−1)
R∏
s=r
(1− qs)
The expected inaccuracy for any parameter θ is then given by:
E[|θˆr − θ|] =
R∑
r=1
(
0.5pDr + 0.5p
U
r
) |θˆr − θ|
where θˆr is the estimated parameter associated with switching in row r. As discussed above,
for ρ this is implied by the midpoint of the certainty equivalents defined by the switching
row. For λ the value is defined both by the midpoint of the certainty equivalent and the
estimated ρˆ from MPL 1.
E.2 Comparison of MPL Simulation to Survey Data
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Our simulations appear to underestimate the amount of error in the MPL. To understand
how this pattern compares to actual behavior we compare estimates from a previous survey
to the pattern of behavior generated by simulating choices using the procedure above. By
doing so we can identify whether our simulations are providing a reasonable approximation
to the level of measurement error in the survey. In particular, we use the results of three
MPLs collected in a separate representative U.S. survey (Chapman et al., 2018). The first
two of these MPLs offered participants a choice between fixed amounts and 50:50 lotteries
over gains: a lottery over $0 and $5 and a lottery between $1 and $4 respectively. The third
MPL offered participants a choice between fixed amounts and a 50:50 lottery between a loss
of $5 and a gain of $5.
Participants in the survey were much more likely to be attracted to particularly salient
rows of the MPL than our simulation would suggest, as shown in Figure E.1. A high
proportion of survey participants switched in rows near the ends of the MPL (despite the
fact that these values correspond to extreme parameter values).7 This pattern suggests that
the framing of the MPL affects choices and, as we did not account for framing effects in the
simulation, that the simulations may miss an important source of error in the MPL.
In fact, the simulations suggest that the level of measurement error in our simulation was
lower than that in the survey. In the survey, the correlation was 0.69; in the simulation it
is slightly higher (0.73). Further, a significant degree of the correlation in the survey data is
explained by participants repeatedly switching at the extremes at the end of MPL: choices
which are consistent, but unlikely to be accurate given the extreme parameter values they
imply. Excluding such participants the correlation between the two MPLs falls to 0.50 in
the survey, compared to 0.61 in the simulated data.
Further evidence that the survey contained more measurement error is that there are also
considerably fewer first order stochastically dominated choices in the simulated loss aversion
7Amounts with zero choices in these histograms reflect the fact that, unlike the hypothetical MPLs in the
previous section, the fixed amounts in these MPLs were not at regular intervals meaning that some values
could not be chosen by the participants.
Online Appendix–32
Figure E.1: MPL endpoints are chosen more frequently in real data.
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Notes: The figure displays the real and simulated responses to the two risk aversion MPLs in Chapman et
al. (2018).
MPL than in observed in reality. In our simulated data, 20% of participants have missing
data. In the survey data, in comparison, we were unable to elicit loss aversion parameters for
37% of participants. Again, it appears the simulation procedure underestimates the degree
of noise in the MPL method in practice.
F Robustness to Misspecification
Online Appendix–33
In this section we provide detailed evidence supporting the analysis in Section 5.1. Additional
simulations show that misspecifying the utility function used does not reduce the accuracy
of the DOSE parameter estimates. Accurate estimates can still be obtained by using the
correct utility function after the fact and, even without re-estimating the results, the DOSE
estimates are highly correlated with the true parameter values. Further, DOSE still performs
well when estimating a utility function with differential curvature across gains and losses,
despite the absence of questions just with losses in our dataset. Finally, re-estimating our
survey data with alternative utility functions supports the use of the utility function in (1):
on average curvature over gains and losses is very similar, and the function fits the choice
data better than alternative specifications.
F.1 Additional Simulation Results
To illustrate both the flexibility and robustness of DOSE, we present the results of two addi-
tional parameter recovery exercises. The first shows that misspecifying the utility function
used in the question selection procedure does not lead to inaccurate parameter estimates.
The second demonstrates that DOSE is able to capture meaningful information about pref-
erences when extending the utility function to allow for risk aversion to vary across gains
and losses.
F.1.1 Misspecification of the Utility Function
To test the robustness of the DOSE estimates to misspecification, we run DOSE on the same
set of simulated subjects—each of whom has CRRA utility—but assuming a CARA utility
function in the question selection procedure. We then compare the correlation between the
risk aversion and loss aversion parameters under the different procedures, and demonstrate
how—even though the question selection procedure is misspecified—the data collected can
be re-estimated to elicit accurate CRRA utility parameters.
Specifically we run DOSE assuming the following exponential (CARA) utility function,
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as suggested by Ko¨bberling and Wakker (2005):
u(x, γi, λi) =

1−e−γix
γi
for x ≥ 0
λi
(
eγix−1
γi
)
for x < 0
(5)
where λ represents loss aversion and γ captures risk aversion.
As with the main simulations, we start by constructing a simulated dataset by estimating
the procedure on the data from the 120 participants in Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) and
Frydman et al. (2011).8 The joint posterior from that procedure is then used to draw
simulated participants, and a 20 question DOSE procedure is simulated for each participant.
Misspecifying the utility function does not lead to a loss of accuracy, as shown in Ta-
ble F.1. For loss aversion, very similar estimates are obtained even when the CARA function
is incorrectly used (see the bottom panel of the table). For risk aversion, we can recover the
same estimates by using the correct utility function after the data collection process. Fur-
ther, even without re-estimating, the Spearman correlation between the estimated CARA
parameters and the true (CRRA) parameter values is very high—and notably higher than
the correlations for either the MPL (0.45) or the Lottery Menu (0.28) procedures reported
earlier in the paper. As such, the assumptions over parametric form are unlikely to be critical
if researchers are interested in identifying correlations rather than the level of the risk and
loss aversion estimates.
F.1.2 Allowing for Differential Risk Aversion over Gains and Losses
In this subsection we show that DOSE can obtain reasonably accurate estimates for a utility
function with differential utility curvature between gains and losses, even if no questions
solely involving losses are asked.
In particular, we simulate the DOSE procedure using the same procedure as outlined in
8As in the main text, we implement a discretized uniform prior. For λ and µ we use the same parameter
range as in the main estimation procedure. For γ we construct the range of the prior based on calculating
the Coefficient of Absolute Risk Aversion for the prior range for ρ for a prize of $1.
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Table F.1: DOSE estimates are robust to utility function misspecification.
Average inaccuracy Correlation with true value
10 question 20 question 10 question 20 question
Loss Aversion
CRRA (Not misspecified) 21% 14% 0.84 0.89
CARA (Misspecified) 23% 16% 0.84 0.90
CARA re-estimated as CRRA 21% 15% 0.85 0.91
Risk Aversion
CRRA (Not misspecified) 21% 16% 0.66 0.79
CARA (Misspecified) n.a. n.a. 0.58 0.75
CARA re-estimated as CRRA 21% 15% 0.67 0.77
Notes: Inaccuracy is defined as the absolute distance from the true parameter value displayed as a percent-
age of the true value. “Correlation with true value” displays the Spearman correlation coefficient between
the true parameter and the estimated parameters.
Section 3.2, but assuming a utility function with different power exponents in the gain and
loss domain, as suggested by Prospect Theory (Kahneman and Tversky, 1979):
u(x, ρ+i , ρ
−
i , λi) =

u(x) = xρ
+
i for x ≥ 0
u(x) = −λi(−x)ρ−i for x < 0
(6)
As with the main simulations, we start by constructing a simulated dataset by estimating
the procedure on the data from the 120 participants in Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) and
Frydman et al. (2011).9 The joint posterior from that procedure is then used to draw
simulated participants, and a 20 question DOSE procedure is simulated for each participant.
DOSE extracts meaningful information about all four parameters, although with less
9As in the main text, we implement a discretized uniform prior, using the same prior range for both risk
aversion parameters as we use for ρ.
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Table F.2: DOSE estimates of the 4 parameter model are less accurate.
CRRA CRRA with ρ+ and ρ−
Average Correlation Average Correlation
inaccuracy w/true value inaccuracy w/true value
Loss Aversion
DOSE 10 question 21% 0.84 85% 0.61
DOSE 20 question 14% 0.89 63% 0.73
Risk Aversion over Losses
DOSE 10 question n.a. n.a. 38% 0.31
DOSE 20 question n.a. n.a. 31% 0.51
Risk Aversion over Gains
DOSE 10 question 21% 0.66 21% 0.60
DOSE 20 question 16% 0.79 16% 0.73
Notes: Inaccuracy is defined as the absolute distance from the true parameter value displayed as a percent-
age of the true value. “Correlation with true value” displays the Spearman correlation coefficient between
the true parameter and the estimated parameters.
precision than in the three parameter model, as shown in Table F.2. For risk aversion over
gains the accuracy of the estimates are similar to those for the 3 parameter model. For
the two parameters regarding choices over losses, however, the estimates are noisier. The
inaccuracy and correlation with true estimates for the curvature over losses are comparable to
those for the Multiple Price List in the three parameter model. The loss aversion parameter
has higher correlations. Further, although the average inaccuracy is very high, this is largely
an artefact of the fact that there a number of very small values of λ in the simulation.
Excluding the smallest 10% of values of λ (corresponding to values of less than 0.5), the
estimated inaccuracy is 36%.
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F.2 Risk Aversion Over Gains and Losses and Model Fit
The re-estimated survey data provides some support for our assumption of a CRRA utility
with the same curvature over gains and losses in (1). On average the curvature of the risk
aversion parameter is similar across the two domains. Further, our model correctly predicts
more actual choices than the alternative utility functions, or assuming that participants
incorporated their $10 endowment into their utility function.
Re-estimating the survey data as per (6) indicates that overall the power utility coeffi-
cients are similar in the gain and loss domains, as shown in Figure F.1. In particular the
mean difference in the two parameters (ρ+ − ρ− < 1) is -0.04, and the median difference is
-0.11. These results are consistent with previous findings that utility over losses is closer to
linearity (Booij et al., 2010). However, it is clear from the figure that there is considerable
individual heterogeneity that is not captured by these average estimates.
Figure F.1: On average the risk aversion parameter is similar in the loss and gain domains.
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Notes: The figure displays the density of the difference in the risk aversion parameters over gains and losses
(ρ+ − ρ−) from (6).
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The CRRA model in (1) fits our data better than either of the two alternative utility
functions, providing further evidence that the specification is appropriate. In particular, our
main parameter estimates predict 88% of participants’ choices correctly. The CARA model
(see (5)) and the CRRA allowing for differential curvature (see (6)), in contrast, both predict
less than 85% correctly. Although we should not read too much into these differences—given
that they are relatively small and that the questions were selected under the assumption of
a CRRA utility function—they provide some reassurance that our model is not significantly
misspecified.
A similar model fitting exercise shows that participants were not incorporating the $10
initial endowment (that applied only if a choice in the DOSE module was selected for payoff)
in their calculations. If participants did so, every payoff—even those that were negative (with
respect to the endowments)—would appear to be a gain with respect to the amount they
began the survey with (that is, zero). Thus, the only difference between questions with
gains and losses (relative to the endowment) would be the size of the prizes, with those
featuring losses being slightly lower, but positive (with respect to zero). To test whether
such behavior could explain the choices we observe, we re-estimated our model adding $10 to
each payoff, and found that this produced a much worse fit. In particular, the re-estimated
parameters predict only 48% of the choices made by participants—a large decrease from
the 88% predicted using our main parameter estimates. For loss tolerant participants the
performance is no better: the re-estimated parameters explain 49% of choices, the main
estimates explain 91%. Thus, not incorporating the initial endowment and using the loss
aversion parameter significantly improves the explanatory power of the parametric model.
G Additional Analysis of Lab Data Simulations
This Appendix contains additional results from the DOSE simulations using previous labora-
tory data. First we plot the correlations between the DOSE estimates and the final (post-140
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question) parameter estimates, and then present scatter plots displaying the evolution of the
individual-level estimates as more questions are asked. The second subsection then includes
the results from attempts to use Maximum Likelihood Estimation to obtain individual level
estimates using the same data.
G.1 Additional Results from Bayesian Analysis
The DOSE estimates are highly correlated with the final parameter values after just a few
questions, providing further evidence that the procedure elicits considerable information
about preferences very quickly. As shown in Figure G.2, the correlation with the final esti-
mate is above 0.8 for both parameters after a 20 question DOSE sequence. This correlation
is much higher than obtained under the random ordering—particularly in the case of the loss
aversion parameter. Further, a comparison with the correlations obtained using the “optimal
prior” demonstrates again the effectiveness of using a uniform prior for question selection.
DOSE provides relatively accurate estimates of the choice consistency parameter as well
as risk and loss aversion, as shown in Figure G.2. Compared to the random ordering,
the DOSE estimates are closer to and more highly correlated with the post-140 question
estimate, and are more highly correlated with the final estimate throughout the question
sequence. Again, these benefits are similar regardless of whether we use the uniform prior or
the “optimal prior” (see discussion in Section 3.1). It is notable, however, that the estimated
inaccuracy is significantly higher after 20 questions than for either risk or loss aversion. This
difference is likely to reflect the fact that inconsistency could not be accurately identified
until the procedure had asked several similar questions.
DOSE elicits information rapidly for all sets of parameter values in our simulation, as
shown in Figures G.3, G.4 and G.5. These figures demonstrate the progression of the es-
timated value of each of the three parameters towards the final estimate after 10, 20, 50
and 100 questions. After just 10 questions, the estimates for both risk and loss aversion
are clustered around the 45 degree line, reflecting a high degree of correlation with the final
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Figure G.1: Optimal question selection elicits estimates highly correlated with final values.
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Notes: Based on data from Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) and Frydman et al. (2011). Left hand panel shows
Right hand panel shows the correlation between the Bayesian estimates (with uniform initial prior) obtained
after each question and the final estimate, starting at question 10, under different question orders. “Optimal
prior” and “Uniform prior” refer DOSE question selection using corresponding priors. “Random” orders
questions randomly, averaging over 100 different random orderings.
estimates. The consistency estimates take longer to converge—as discussed previously, this
is likely to be a result of the fact that several similar questions have to be asked in order
for the parameter to be pinned down precisely. However, there is no evidence for any of
the parameters that the procedure converges faster for particular parameter values—DOSE
performs well at the individual-level as well as on average.
G.2 Maximum Likelihood Estimation
We also attempted to obtain individual parameter estimates using Maximum Likelihood
Estimation (MLE), however we were frequently unable to estimate parameters for several
participants.10 As shown in Figure G.6, when using fewer than 40 questions (using the
10The MLE procedure was implemented using STATA’s modified Newton-Raphson algorithm. Similar
results were obtained using alternative algorithms. For each participant estimation was attempted three times
(each with up to 16,000 iterations), allowing for alternative initial conditions, different stepping procedures
in non-concave regions and relaxing convergence requirements on the gradient vector.
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Figure G.2: DOSE elicits accurate estimates for the choice consistency parameter faster than
the random ordering.
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original order reported in the original datasets), we could not estimate parameter values
for one quarter of the sample, and we could not obtain estimates for all participants even
when using the full set of 140 questions. This failure is particularly striking given that, for
this purpose, we do not exclude any unrealistic values (such as negative parameters) and
that, in a final attempt to obtain an estimate, we initiated the search algorithm with the
final Bayesian estimate of each individual’s parameters. As such these numbers are an over-
estimate of the proportion of participants for whom meaningful estimates could be recovered
in reality; Frydman et al. (2011) in their initial study obtained estimates for only 64 of 83
participants (7 were excluded for other reasons), whereas we report estimates for 82 out of
the 90 participants.
Further, the estimates that were obtained by MLE with a small number of questions
appear much more inaccurate than those from the Bayesian procedure, as shown by the
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Figure G.3: Correlations between final estimates of the risk aversion parameter and the
estimates after selected rounds.
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Notes: The figure is based on authors’ analysis of data from Sokol-Hessner et al. (2009) and Frydman et
al. (2011). Each panel plots the DOSE estimate (using a uniform prior) of the exponent from the utility
function (1) against the Bayesian estimate after 140 questions.
line plots in Figure G.6. After 140 rounds, the estimates from the different procedures
are, as expected, very similar: the correlation between the final MLE and final Bayesian
estimates was 0.85 for risk aversion, and 0.95 for loss aversion, while the median distance
between the two estimates was less than 2% (of the Bayesian estimate) for both parameters.
However, the Bayesian estimates are much closer to these final values after many fewer
questions.11 In addition, the Bayesian estimates are generally more accurate than the MLE
estimates that do exist even where no MLE estimate can be obtained at all.12 Not only can
the Bayesian procedure obtain an estimate in those circumstances, those estimates contain
11To ensure comparability between the two sets of estimates, when calculating the distance from the final
estimate we constrain the MLE estimates to the bounds of the prior used for the Bayesian estimates.
12Note that the “jerky” nature of the line relating to the inaccuracy when no MLE estimate is available
is explained by the fact that—particularly after question 40—few participants do not have MLE estimates,
with the precise number varying from round to round. The large spike at round 61, for example, is explained
by all but two participants having MLE estimates available.
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Figure G.4: Correlations between final estimates of the loss aversion parameter and the
estimates after selected rounds.
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valuable information.
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Figure G.5: Correlations between final estimates of the consistency parameter and the esti-
mates after selected rounds.
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(2) against the Bayesian estimate after 140 questions.
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Figure G.6: With a small number of questions the Bayesian procedure provides more accurate
estimates than Maximum Likelihood Estimation.
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